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Abstract
The behavior of economies with floating exchange rates is examined
in three related essays. Essay I examines the relationship between
prices and exchange rates during a number of episodes of flexible ex-
change rates, and finds considerable support for the hypothesis of pur-
chasing power parity. Essay II is concerned with the efficiency of the
market in forward exchange; it finds that the hypothesis of "rational
expectations", while appearing plausible for some historical episodes,
can be rejected for recent experience. Finally, Essay III examines the
popular argument that economies under floating exchange rates are vul-
nerable to destabilizing speculation. It shows how this is possible in
theoretical models; but an examination of an alleged example of destabiliz-
ing speculation, France during the 1920's, suggests that government policy,
rather than any malfunctioning of markets, was responsible for the in-
stability of the franc.
Thesis Supervisor: Rudiger Dornbusch
Title: Associate Professor of Economics
ESSAY I
PURCHASING POWER PARITY AND EXCHANGE RATES:
ANOTHER LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE
Introduction
There is a perennial debate in international economics between those
who regard the exchange rate as (nothing but) the relative price of two
monies, and those who regard it as (also) the relative price of domestic
and foreign goods. The proposition that relative goods prices are not af-
fected by exchange rates -- or, equivalently, that exchange rate changes
will be proportional to relative inflation -- is generally referred to
as the doctrine of purchasing power parity. While purchasing power
parity is not a complete theory of exchange rates, any more than its alter
ego, the law of one price, is a complete theory of world inflation under
a fixed rate regime, PPP would have important implications for the analysis
of flexible rates if true.
Few international economists would deny that purchasing power parity
holds in some sufficiently long run. But most would probably be skeptical
of any assertion that PPP holds in the short run. Inspection of data on
prices and exchange rates suggests that relative inflation is not always
reflected in exchange rate changes, on one hand, and that changes in ex-
change rates produce changes in relative prices, that is, are not fully
reflected in differential inflation, on the other.2 As a result, working
Work on purchasing power parity is surveyed in Officer (1976).
2 An analysis of this kind may be found in Dornbusch and Krugman (1976).
economists generally use PPP as a long-run theory while relying on a
Keynesian theory, in which exchange rates affect relative prices, for
short-run analysis.
The purpose of this paper is to cast a skeptical look at the received
wisdom on exchange rates and prices. In essence, the argument is that
problems arising from the fact that neither prices nor exchange rates
can properly be regarded as exogenous could lead one to reject PPP in a
world in which it was in fact valid. This is particularly likely to
happen in a world of "dirty" or "managed" floating, in which the monetary
authority's behavior is affected by the exchange rate.
To provide support for this skepticism, I examine some of the
evidence on prices and exchange rates from the two major episodes of
floating exchange rates in this century: the period of inconvertibility
following the First World War, and the period following the breakdown of
the Smithsonian Accord in 1973. I show that simple statistical tests
lead one to reject PPP, but that this rejection can be explained by a
simple model in which PPP is actually true. I then test purchasing power
parity by methods which allow for the endogeneity of both prices and ex-
change rates, and come up with results more favorable to PPP.
The paper is in four sections. The first section carries out some
simple tests of PPP, which produce unfavorable results for all countries
except some of those experiencing high inflation. The second section
develops a model of exchange rate determination, and shows how the simul-
taneity of the system can bias the tests of the first section. In the
third section some tests designed to bypass these difficulties are carried
out, which appear to put PPP in a more favorable light. Some further
evidence is presented, however, which casts renewed doubt on the adequacy
of PPP as a short-run theory. Finally, in the fourth section, the evidence
is summarized.
I. Simple Tests of Purchasing Power Parity
The hypothesis of purchasing power parity may be written as
(1) S = AP/P*
where S = exchange rate, domestic currency for foreign
A = arbitrary constant term
P = domestic price level, in domestic currency
P* = foreign price level, in foreign currency
It is often convenient to state PPP as a proposition about the logarithms
of variables. Let lower-case letters represent the logs of the variables
just defined; then PPP implies
(2) s = a + p - p*
A natural test of PPP, which has been employed by Bilson (1976),
Frenkel (1976), and Frankel (1977), is to regress the spot exchange rate
on relative prices, that is, to estimate the equation
(3) s = a + b(p - p*)
We can then test PPP by testing the hypothesis b = 1.
In Table I I report estimates of (3), based on monthly data on whole-
sale prices and exchange rates, for seven floating exchange rates. The
Table I
TESTS OF PPP, ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES
Exchange
Mark/Dollar
Dollar/Pound
Sterling
French Franc/
Dollar
Mark/Dollar
Lira/Dollar
Swiss Franc/
Dollar
Pound Sterling
/Dollar
Time Period
Feb. 1920-
Dec. 1923
Feb. 1920-
Dec. 1925
Feb. 1920-
Dec. 1926
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
a
-.382
(.030)
-.085
(.006)
b
0.980
(.004)
0,812
(.040)
-.026 1.139
(.015) (.033)
.054 -0.113
(.016) (.131)
.111 1.429
(.009) (.092)
.037 0.659
(.015) (.099)
.042 1.337
(.011) (.086)
SEE
0.171
R2
0.999
D-W
0.677
0.039 0.859 0.387
0.080 0.935 0.324
0.051 0.018 0.522
0.051 0.858 0.228
0.058 0.527 0.759
0.052 0.859 0.336
Notes: These regressions are ordinary least squares estimates of the equation
s = a + b(p - p*) where s is the log of the exchange rate, p and p* the logs
of domestic and foreign wholesale prices, respectively. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors.
All data is monthly; for the 1920's it is from International Abstract
of Economic Statistics, for the 1970's from International Financial Statistics.
episodes chosen -- three from the 1920's, four from the 1970's -- cover
a wide variety of experience. In the 1920's Germany experienced a hyper-
inflation, France a high but not catastrophic rate of inflation, while
in Britain prices fell by more than 50 percent over the period. In the
1970's Britain and Italy had high inflation, Germany low inflation, and
Switzerland nearly stable prices.
The results of the test are not encouraging for PPP. Of the seven
estimates of b, one has the wrong sign, and only two, the estimates for
the franc and mark in the 1920's, are particularly close to one. And
the fact that the coefficient for hyperinflation Germany is close to one
is in some ways deceptive. When prices grow by a factor of a hundred
billion, even a small deviation of b from one can produce large changes
in relative goods prices.
A formal test of the hypothesis b = 1 leads to rejection of the
hypothesis for all seven exchange rates. The test is of doubtful value,
however, since the Durbin-Watson statistics indicate substantial serial
correlation of the errors. If we are willing to assume first-order serial
correlation, the equations can be reestimated using Cochrane-Orcutt, and
the hypothesis b = 1 tested with an asymptotic t-statistic. This is done
in Table II.
The results in Table II do not give much comfort to the believer in
PPP. It is true that there are now two exchange rates, the lira and the
pound sterling in the 1970's, for which the hypothesis b = 1 cannot be
rejected, but that is not exactly strong support for the theory. Several
of the estimates of b change a great deal, suggesting that the serially
Table II
TESTS OF PPP, COCHRANE-ORCUTT
Exchange Rate
Mark/Dollar
Pound Sterling
/Dollar
French Franc/
Dollar
Mark/Dollar
Lira/Dollar
Swiss Franc/
Dollar
Pound Sterling
/Dollar
Time Period
Feb. 1920-
Dec. 1923
Feb. 1920-
Dec. 1925
Feb. 1920-
Dec. 1926
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
a
-.398
(.062)
b
0.981
(.007)
-.098 0.719
(.016) (.091)
-.097 1.291
(.054) (.093)
.109 0.328
(.050) (.373)
.136 1.101
(.054) (.210)
-.107 -.096
(.081) (.130)
.271 .515
(.155) (.439)
SEE
.127
.023
.044
.034
.023
.036
.028
R
2
0.9996
P
0.641
0.951 0.794
0.981 0.880
0.552 0.762
0.970 0.921
0.819 0.930
0.957 0.963
Notes: These are estimates of the equation s = a + b(p - p*), with the variables
defined as in Table I, under the assumption of first-order serial correlation.
The column labeled p gives estimates of the coefficient of serial correlation.
Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.
correlated errors are actually evidence of misspecification -- omitted
variables which are correlated with relative prices. And the estimated
serial correlation is very high for some of the exchange rates, even
bearing in mind that we are dealing with monthly data. This is further
evidence that something is wrong with PPP, even for the lira, where the
ceofficient b is near one.
These simple tests, then, confirm the casual impression that exchange
rate movements in the short run are not closely related to price changes.
But careful consideration of the role of purchasing power parity in a model
of the exchange rate shows that tests of this kind might lead us to reject
PPP when it is, in fact, true.
II. Purchasing Power Parity in a Simple Model of the Exchange Rate
In this section I analyze some pitfalls in the testing of purchasing
power parity. I develop a simple model of exchange rates which has three
elements: a purchasing power parity equation, a price level equation, and
a reaction function of the monetary authority. In this simple model an
ordinary least squares estimate of the kind carried out in Section I will
be biased, generally in such a way as to make prices seem to be less than
fully reflected in the exchange rate.
It must be emphasized that the model developed in this section is not
seriously advanced as-a complete theory of exchange rates. The extreme
simplicity and monetarist flavor of the model are not so much proposed as
realistic aspects of the world as they are used as debating points. By showing
The use of the change in estimated parameters when generalized least squares
is applied to test for misspecification has been proposed by Hausman (1977).
that a monetarist world can appear to observers to be anything but, the
model encourages more caution in the interpretation of evidence.
Let us suppose, then, that the exchange rate and price level are
determined simultaneously as part of a three equation system. The first
is the equation of purchasing power parity,
(4) s = a + p - p* + u
where s, p, p* have the definitions given above and u is a random term.
The economic interpretation of changes in u is that they are changes in
the price of domestic relative to foreign goods on world markets.
The next equation is the demand for money, which may also be regarded
as an equation for the price level,
(5) m = p + y + v
where m is the log of the money supply, y the log of real income, and v
another random term.1
To these equations we add the supply of money. As we will see in a
moment, the possibility that the behavior of the monetary authority may
depend in part on the exchange rate has important econometric implications.
We can formalize this by an equation of the form
(6) m = m - s + w
I omit any interest rate effect for simplicity. This also prevents the
variation of the exchange rate from having any speculative component.
where w is still another random term. The general idea here is that the
monetary authority attempts to dampen exchange rate fluctuations by reducing
the money supply when the currency depreciates and increasing it when the
currency appreciates.
Finally, let us close the system by assuming p* and y fixed. The first
is the presumably harmless "small-country" assumption, the second a drastic
simplification which is justified only by the fact that we are attempting
to illustrate a point rather than be fully realistic.
Now there are two ways in which researchers generally look at purchasing
power parity. One is to ask whether differential inflation is reflected
in exchange rate changes. This is more or less equivalent to estimating the
equation s = a + b(p - p*) and asking whether b equals one. The other way
of looking at PPP is to ask whether exchange rate changes affect relative
goods prices. One way of doing this would be to estimate the equation
(s - p + p*) = c + ds, where the expression (s - p + p*) is what is some-
times referred to as the real exchange rate.
Suppose a researcher were to estimate these two equations, and the
model we have just developed were a true representation of the world. What
would he find? The answer obviously depends on the distribution of the
shocks u, v, and w. In the general case where u, v, and w are correlated,
anything can happen. If we assume the shocks are uncorrelated with variances
a2 , 0a, 2 , the probability limits of the coefficients in the two test
1 Obviously, sticky prices or wages would make y endogenous. Allowing for
them would, unfortunately, complicate the model so much as to make it com-
pletely unmanageable.
equations become:1
2 2 2
-A + +.a
U V Wplim b = u v < 1
2 2 +2 2 + 0 2
u v W
A .(1 + e)r 0. 2
plim d = u > 0
a + 2 + a
u V W
A A
These are suggestive results. Examining the expressions for b and d
yields several insights about the kinds of pitfalls one is likely to encounter
in empirical work on prices and exchange rates:
(i) As long as the monetary authority makes some effort to stabilize
the exchange rate (6 > 0) and there are "real" as well as "nominal" shocks
(a > 0), one will observe a failure of inflation to be fully reflected
u
in the exchange rate, and exchange rate changes will seem to have an effect
on relative goods prices.
(ii) If, however, nominal disturbances are very large relative to real
disturbances (02 and 02 large relative to 2) , the estimated coefficientsv w U
will be close to their true values. This is of course no more than a
special case of Samuelson's (1964) observation that we should only expect
PPP to hold when disturbances are purely monetary in character.
On reflection these observations may be obvious, but they can easily be
overlooked. It is important that empirical testing of PPP take account of
the statistical problems caused by simultaneity. In the next section I
In the general case it is not possible to derive small sample results for
these estimates. If we are willing to assume normality of u, w, and v,
however, the probability limits are also the expected values of b and d in
small samples.
attempt to test purchasing power parity in ways that avoid the difficulties
analyzed in this section.
III. Revised Tests of PPP
The upshot of the argument in the last section was that simple regres-
sions of exchange rates on prices or vice versa are liable to give rise to
coefficients which differ from one because neither the exchange rate nor
the price level can properly be regarded as exogenous. There are two
ways of getting around this problem. One is to restrict one's empirical
testing to cases in which monetary shocks predominate over everything else.
Thus Frenkel (1976) is justified in using ordinary least squares to analyze
the German hyperinflation. For cases where monetary events are not so ex-
treme, we can attempt to deal with simultaneity by using an instrumental
variable technique.
The usual problem in applying instrumental variables is the difficulty
in finding suitable instruments. For testing PPP, however, there is a
relatively easy way out. For all of the exchange rates covered in this paper,
prices in the country rose either markedly faster or markedly more slowly
than in the U.S. during the period examined. Thus a time trend, which we
can reasonably hope is uncorrelated with the errors in the PPP equation, forms
a fairly good instrument for relative prices.
Table III reports the results of estimating the equation s = a + b(p - p*)
by instrumental variables for the six non-hyperinflation episodes. These
results are not too different from the ordinary least squares results
reported in Table I. As before, Germany in the 1970's shows a perverse
Table III
TESTS OF PPP, INSTRUMENTAL ESTIMATES
Exchange Rate Time Period
Pound Sterling
/Dollar
French Franc/
Dollar
Mark/Dollar
Lira/Dollar
Swiss Franc/
Dollar
Pound Sterling
/Dollar
Feb. 1920-
Dec. 1925
Feb. 1920-
Dec. 1926
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
a
-.074
(.067)
b
0.946
(.054)
-.002 1.070
(.016) (.037)
.051
(.017)
-.145
(.142)
.100 1.699
(.010) (.125)
.049 0.760
(.016) (.107)
.038
(.011)
1.378
(.089)
SEE
0.042
R
2
0.835
D-W
0.352
0.082 0.932 0.318
0.051 0.017 0.523
0.056 0.827 0.215
0.058 0.514 0.840
0.052 0.858 0.337
Notes: These are all estimates of the equation s = a + b(p - p*), where the
variables are as defined in Table I. The estimates are by instrumental variables,
using a constant and a time trend as instruments. Figures in parentheses are
asymptotic standard errors.
relationship, while the other estimates of b are distributed around one.
Some are closer, some further; two estimates, for the pound and the franc
in the 1920's, are now quite close to one and the hypothesis b = 1 cannot
be rejected for them. As before, however, the serial correlation of the
errors, indicated by the low Durbin-Watson statistics, invalidates the
tests.
When we correct for serial correlation, in Table IV, the instrumental
variable approach makes more of a difference. Where in Section I we found
that taking serial correlation into account caused several coefficients to
change drastically, in this case the coefficients do not change much.
What do change are estimated standard errors: taking serial correlation
into account, it is no longer possible to reject the hypothesis b = 1 at
the 95 percent level for any of the episodes. It appears that the perverse
result for the mark may at least in part reflect the fact that, since German
and U.S. inflation have not been too different, there is very little power
in the test. We should also note that a reassuring result of applying
instrumental variables is that in every case the estimated serial correla-
tion of the errors goes down (we will have more to say about serial correla-
tion below).
While not overwhelming, these results are more favorable to PPP than
the results of the first section. They indicate that the diehard believer
in PPP can make a case that the apparent failures of PPP in the short run
actually represent the interaction of real shocks and endogenous monetary
policy. Is there any way to refute this argument? There are several ways
in which we might try to evaluate PPP as a theory. We can ask how much it
Table IV
TESTS OF PPP, INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES CORRECTED
FOR FIRST-ORDER SERIAL CORRELATION
Exchange Rate Time Period
Pound Sterling
/Dollar
French Franc/
Dollar
Mark/Dollar
Lira/Dollar
Swiss Franc/
Dollar
Pound Sterling
/Dollar
Feb. 1920-
Dec. 1925
Feb. 1920-
Dec. 1926
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
July 1973-
Dec. 1976
a
-.084
(.017)
b
0.856
(.125)
.002 1.053
(.057) (.122)
.089 0.168
(.055) (.427)
.070 1.651
(.066) (.460)
.059
(.032)
0.817
(.208)
.038 1.405
(.044) (.268)
SEE
.023
.046
.034
.025
.049
.029
R
2
0.949
P
0,781
0.979 0.839
0.550 0.740
0.965 0.896
0.660 0.554
0.954 0.833
Notes: These are estimates of the equation s = a + b(p - p*) by instrumental
variables under the assumption that errors have first-order serial correlation.
A time trend and a constant were used as instruments. Numbers in parentheses
are asymptotic standard errors.
explains; we can ask how large the deviations from PPP are in some absolute
sense; and we can ask whether the deviations from PPP are in some sense
systematic, i.e., whether there is evidence that a simple PPP explanation
of the exchange rate omits important variables.
Table V presents some evidence bearing on these questions. One way
of looking at PPP is as an assertion that the "real exchange rate"
s - p + p* ought to remain relatively constant even if prices and the
exchange rate are changing. In the first column the variance of the real
exchange rate is compared with the variance of the exchange rate itself.
In every case except that of modern Germany, the real exchange rate is in fact
substantially more stable than the unadjusted rate. Not surprisingly, the
difference is most marked for the exchange rates where the difference in
inflation rates was largest.
The second column shows the standard deviation of the real exchange
rate around its mean value, both measured in logs. Since the variables
are in logs, these numbers can be interpreted as percentages. On this
criterion, pruchasing power parity does not look quite so good, since the
variations in relative prices seem fairly considerable in absolute terms.
For purposes of comparison, one might recall that such international mone-
tary traumas as the return to gold in 1925, the devaluation of the pound
sterling in 1967, and the effective devaluation of the dollar in 1971-73
involved exchange rate changes of only 10 to 20 percent.
Perhaps as important as the absolute size of the deviations from PPP
is their distribution: they are largest for Germany, the country with the
most unstable monetary events. The simple model of Section II would predict
Table V
SUMMARY STATISTICS ON PPP
Exchange
Rate
Mark/Dollar
Pound Sterling
/Dollar
French Franc/
Dollar
Mark/Dollar
Lira/Dollar
Swiss Franc/
Dollar
Pound Sterling
/Dollar
Time Period
Feb. 1920-Dec. 1923
Feb. 1920-Dec. 1925
Feb. 1920-Dec. 1926
July 1973-Dec. 1976
July 1973-Dec. 1976
July 1973-Dec. 1976
July 1973-Dec. 1976
Variance
Ratio
0.0005
0.187
0.079
2.761
0.228
0.614
0.196
Standard
Deviation
0.208
0.044
0.088
0.084
0.063
0.065
0.060
Serial
Correlation
0.765
0.828
0.851
0.854
0.935
0.538
0.897
Notes: The numbers have the following interpretations. The variance ratio is
the ratio of the variance of the log of the real exchange rate, s - p + p*,
to the variance of the log of the exchange rate proper. The standard devia-
tion is the standard deviation of the log of the real exchange rate. Serial
correlation is the estimated first order serial correlation of the deviation
of s - p + p* from its mean value.
no relationship between the two, since variations in the real exchange
rate would be produced by shocks independent of monetary events. This cross-
sectional evidence may be a sounder basis for questioning PPP than the time
series evidence usually used.
Finally, the last column shows the estimated serial correlation of
deviations of the real exchange rate from its mean. The serial correlation
is substantial in all cases. It is true that, bearing in mind that this
is monthly data, the degree of serial correlation is not unusual for an
economic model; but this may be more of a comment on the success of economic
models in general than on the validity of PPP. In any case, the serial
correlation might be taken as evidence of omitted variables determining
the exchange rate.
There is some evidence, then, that there is more to exchange rates
than PPP. This evidence is that the deviations of exchange rates from PPP
are large, fairly persistent, and seem to be larger in countries with un-
stable monetary policies.
IV. Conclusions
This paper has reviewed some of the evidence on prices and exchange
rates, with the intention of testing the validity of the popular theory
of purchasing power parity. It reached the following conclusions:
(i) Simple tests reject the hypothesis that exchange rate changes
are proportional to relative inflation for all cases studied.
(ii) A theoretical analysis suggests, however, that simple tests of
PPP can be misled by problems of simultaneity.
(iii) When methods designed to avoid these problems are applied, the
results are more favorable to PPP.
(iv) Finally, however, further examination of the evidence does turn
up some more subtle evidence that there is more to exchange rates than PPP.
The moral of this paper is not, then, that purchasing power parity is
always and continuously true. Rather, it is that one must be cautious
in determining the extent of and the reasons for failure of PPP to hold,
for the world has laid statistical traps for the unwary.
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ESSAY II
THE EFFICIENCY OF THE FORWARD EXCHANGE MARKET:
EVIDENCE FROM THE TWENTIES AND THE SEVENTIES
Introduction
One of the central questions about the functioning of a flexible ex-
change rate regime is the role of speculation. Both during the interwar
period and more recently it has been argued by some that, when governments
do not intervene to stabilize them, exchange markets are subject to large
scale speculative runs which can have disruptive effects on the rest of the
economy. Fear of destabilizing speculation is a major reason why most of
the world's countries continue to peg their currencies, and why most coun-
tries with floating currencies continue to intervene to smooth out fluctuations.1
There is an equally venerable argument, however, which denies that specu-
lation can have any independent disruptive effect on an economy which is
otherwise stable. This point of view was perhaps best expressed by Keynes
(1924), who wrote that "the successful speculator makes his profit by antici-
pating, not by modifying, existing economic tendencies." In recent years
this argument has been formalized in models in which expectations are as-
sumed to be "rational" in the sense of Muth (1961). This concept of
rationality holds that participants in a market use all available information
in forming their expectations, and that as a consequence the expectations of
The argument that speculation can have destabilizing effects was made
effectively by Nurkse (1944). More recently, a similar doctrine has become
popular under the name of the "vicious and virtuous circle of prices and
exchange rates." The best-known exposition of this doctrine is the speech
of Bernard Clappier at the IMF Meeting in Manila, 1975.
the market are the same as the prediction of the model. In models which
assume rational expectations the economy is never destabilized by specula-
tion if it would otherwise have been stable. 1
The purpose of this paper is to present some evidence on the rationality
of expectations under flexible exchange rates. Specifically, I test the
market in forward exchange for the presence of unexploited information.
Previous work on this subject has produced conflicting results. Aliber
(1975), Dooley and Schafer (1976), and Frankel (1977), examining the post-
1973 experience, have found evidence of unexploited information. On the
other hand, Frenkel (1976, 1977), examining data from the 1920's, has
found substantial support for the hypothesis of rational expectations.
One of the major conclusions of this paper is that the difference in
results is in large part due to the choice of different episodes to study;
the evidence indicates that this is a case where "things don't work like
they used to."
In this paper I examine the behavior of six forward exchange rates:
the mark/pound, French franc/pound, and dollar/pound rates in the 1920's;
the mark/dollar, pound/dollar, and lira/dollar rates in the 1970's. The
paper is in four sections. Section I examines the hypothesis of rational
expectations, and develops a standard set of tests. In Section II these
tests are applied in turn to each of the five non-hyperinflation exchange
rates. Section III looks in some detail at the mark exchange rate in the
1920's, a case which presents special conceptual and statistical difficulties
because of the extreme rate of depreciation. Finally, Section IV summarizes
the results of previous sections.
There are many exchange rate models assuming rational expectations. A
representative model is that of Mussa (1976); for further discussion and
references, see the survey by Isard (1977).
I. Testing Rationality of Forward Markets
Testing rationality of markets has become an important growth industry
in the economics profession. In this section I examine what behavior the
forward market would exhibit if it were "rational," and develop a set of
approximate tests. The limitations of the tests are also given a prelimi-
nary discussion.
If we ignore the existence of margin requirements, the forward ex-
change market is purely a market in gambles, requiring no current commitment
of funds. Dealers in forward exchange agree to exchange currencies at a
future date at a predetermined rate of exchange, and then make capital
losses or gains depending on the actual rate of exchange when the contract
comes due. An examination of these losses or gains suggests a simple
criterion for rationality. Suppose that at time t-l an investor buys marks
forward (and sells dollars forward), with the contract due at time t. He
is then assured, for every dollar's worth of contract, of reveiving FRt 1
marks at time t, where FR is the forward exchange rate when the contractt-l
is signed. On the other hand, he must give up SRt marks to buy the dollar
to honor his end of the contract, where SRt is the spot rate when the
contract comes due. His profit is then FRt I - SRt . A natural assumption
would be that in an efficient market expected profits will be competed
away, so that we will find FRt-1 = E[SRt/It_ 1], where the expectation of
SR is taken conditional on all information available to the market at time
t-l.
Even assuming risk-neutrality, however, this cannot be quite right.
For if we had measured the profits in dollars instead of marks, the criterion
would instead have come out (1/FRt_1) = E[(l/SRt)]. Since 1/SR is a
convex function, both criteria cannot be satisfied simultaneously. This
is a well-known paradox; it is related to some of the paradoxes which
arise in indexation (see, for example, Fischer (1975)). There are several
possible solutions:
(i) We can make a full analysis in terms of the utility functions of
speculators and the resulting market demand curves. This has been done by
Kouri (1976); unfortunately, it does not yield any easily testable proposi-
tions.
(ii) If all speculators can be presumed to agree on some common price
index, we can look at the expected real value of a contract. This approach
will be used in the discussion of hyperinflation in Section III, below.
(iii) Finally, a solution which implicitly lies behind most empirical
testing is that if the uncertainty about the exchange rate is small, both
criteria can be approximately fulfilled. Numerical examples confirm that,
for the size of uncertainty found other than in very high inflations, the
difference between E[l/SR] and 1/E[SR] will not be very large.2
When uncertainty is small, then, testing whether the forward rate is
the expected future spot rate is an approximate test for rationality.
Rather than choose to measure the exchange rate in one currency or the
other, a popular compromise is to use logarithms, so that the test criterion
The issue is discussed in papers by Roper, McCulloch, and Siegel (all 1975).
Those authors agreed that the problem is empirically unimportant, which is
correct for normal circumstances but, as shown later, not under conditions
of very high inflation.
For example, consider an exchange rate which one month from now has an
equal probability of being 1.05 and 0.95. This would ordinarily be considered
a high degree of uncertainty; but the difference between 1/E[SR] and E[1/SR]
is only 0.25 percent.
becomes
(1) E[S t I Iti ] - Ft-l = 0
where S = log of SRt
F = log of FRt
This criterion will also be approximately correct if uncertainty is small.
How can we test to see whether (1) is true? In principle we should
examine all information that was available to the market when a forward
contract was signed, and ask whether this information in combination with
the forward rate yields a better prediction of S than the forward rate
alone. In practice we will usually be satisfied with asking whether some
small set of information, generally drawn from the history of exchange
rates, allows us to add anything to the forward rate.
In the next section I will apply four regression-based tests of the
rationality of the forward market:
(i) There should not be any persistent bias in prediction errors,
because otherwise profits could be earned by always selling one currency
forward. This can be tested by estimating the equation
(2) S - F = a
t t-l
and testing the hypothesis a = 0.
(ii) As long as we examine contracts which do not overlap, there must
not be any serial correlation of errors in prediction.1 This can be tested
1
Frankel (1977) has shown that prediction errors from overlapping contracts
will follow a moving average process when expectations are rational,
by estimating the nonlinear equation
(3) S - F = a(l - p) + p(S - F )
t t t-l t-2
and testing the joint hypothesis a = p = 0.
(iii) The forward rate itself must not contain any information about
prediction errors. This can be tested by estimating
St - Ft-1 = a + b'F
and testing a = b' = 0. I will actually run the equivalent regression
(4) S = a + bF
under the assumption of first-order serial correlation, and test the three
way hypothesis a = p = 0, b = 1.
(iv) Finally, past exchange rates must not add any information. I will
test this by running
(5) St = a + bFt-1 + cSt-2
under the assumption of first-order serial correlation, and test the
hypothesis a = c = p = 0, b = i.
It is important to note that these are all necessary conditions for
rationality, and that none of them are sufficient. This has two implications.
First, it is never possible to prove rationality, because there may always
be some variable known to the market but not considered by the researcher
which would have allowed better predictions. Second, the market must pass
all the tests; a "best two out of three" condition is not sufficient.
II. Empirical Evidence: Low and Moderate Inflations
In the last section I developed a set of tests for the rationality of
the forward market. These tests are valid approximations when the disper-
sion of the exchange rate around its expected value is not too large.
This will be the case for situations in which the difference in inflation
between two countries is not more than a few percent per month. In this
section I test rationality for five floating exchange rates which fit
this description. The regression results are reported in Tables I - V,
and the statistical tests based on the regressions are given in Table VI.
In each of Tables I - V, four regressions are reported, corresponding
to equations (2) to (5) in Section I. The two episodes from the twenties
are based on data in Einzig (1937); the other three on exchange rate data
from the Harris Bank Weekly Review (Chicago). In all cases, weekly averages
of one-month forward rates were used, with weeks chosen at one-month inter-
vals so the contracts did not overlap.
The test statistics in Table VI consist of one simple t-statistic and
three likelihood ratio tests. These latter were constructed by comparing
the estimated sum of squared residuals from each equation, which we can
2
call SSR, with the sum of squared prediction errors (St - Ft_) = SSR*,
Under the hypothesis of rational expectations the ratio n * (SSR* - SSR)/SSR
is distributed as X 2(K) where n is the number of observations and K the
number of restrictions tested. 1
The episodes covered are the following:
This test is derived in Theil (1971).
The French Franc, 1922-1926: Over the period 1922-26 the franc
depreciated by roughly 150 percent against the pound sterling, with much
of the depreciation taking place in two dramatic speculative attacks in
1923-24 and 1926. In late 1926 there was a de facto stabilization which
passed imperceptibly into de jure stabilization in 1928. I have argued
elsewhere (Krugman (1977)) that the monetary history of France during the
period can be understood in terms of the pressure on the government to
reduce the real value of its World War I debts by inflation, and the
efforts of the market to anticipate that inflation. The regressions in
Table I and the tests in Table VI indicate that the market was fairly
successful in doing so; we cannot reject the hypothesis of rational expec-
tations.
The Pound Sterling, 1922-1925: The U.K. in the 1920's is one of the
rare cases of a country pursuing a systematic policy of deflation. Tight
credit was applied to gradually appreciate the pound to its pre-war parity.
As in the case of the franc, the forward exchange market was apparently
quite successful at second-guessing this policy; the hypothesis of rational
expectations cannot be rejected.
The Deutsche Mark, 1973-1977: After the initial realignments of the
rate in early 1973, there has been no obvious reason why the dollar-mark
exchange rate should exhibit a secular trend; inflation in the two coun-
tries has been comparable. The exchange rate has gone through a series
of fluctuations which in retrospect appear to have been cycles around a
roughly constant central tendency, but which the market at the time took
as permanent changes. This misjudgment is reflected in the coefficient
on Ft- 1 in 111.3, and in the rejection of rational expectations in Table VI.
Table I
TESTS OF RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS:
Franc/Pound Exchange Rate, Jan. 1922 - Dec. 1926
Dependent
Variable
t t-1
S - F
t t-1
S
t
Coefficient
Constant on Ft-1
0.0101
(.0104)
0.0101
(.0111)
0.2470
(.1384)
0.2487
(.1420)
Coefficient
on St-2 p SEE R2 D-W
-- .0805
.0655 .0803
.9471
(.0308)
.9612
(.1076)
-.0146
(.1102)
1.8426
.0856 .0790 .9513
.0748 .0797 .9513
Equation
I.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
Table II
TESTS OF RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS:
Dollar/Pound Exchange Rate, Jan. 1922 - Dec. 1925
Dependent
Equation Variable
Coefficient
on FtConstant t-1
Coefficient
on S
t-2 p
2
SEE R D-W
.0147
.0231
(.0876) (.1093) (.1117)
1.7769
.1103 .0146
(.1435)
.1223 .0144 .8881
(.1433)
.1131
(.1434)
.0146 .8881
S -F
t t-1
S -F
t t-l
St
II.1
11.2
11.3
11.4
.0020
(.0021)
.0019
(.0024)
.1342
(.0842)
.9126
(.0555)
.1259 .8950
Table III
TESTS OF RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS:
Mark/Dollar Exchange Rate, June 1973 - Feb. 1977
Dependent
Equation Variable
III.1 S - Ft-
111.2 S -F
t t-l
Constant
-. 0007
(.0041)
-.0004
(.0053)
Coefficient
on Ft-1
Coefficient
on St-2 Apl SEE R2
-- .0277
.2551 .0266
D-W
1.3400
.5489 .0246 .7161
-.4892 -.0280 .0242 .7350
(.1441)
111.3
111.4
-.4274
(.1160)
-.2590
(.0772)
.5360
(.1256)
1.2105
(.1400)
Table IV
TESTS OF RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS:
Lira/Dollar Exchange Rate
Dependent
Equation Variable
IV.1 S - Ft
t t-l
IV.2 S -Ft t-1
IV. 3
IV. 4
Constant
.0018
(.0051)
.0012
(.0056)
-.1285
(.0791)
-.2207
(.1454)
Coefficient
on F
t-i
Coefficient
on S
t-2 p
2
SEE R
.0341
.1050
(.1482)
.9334
(.0405)
.4378
(.1357)
.4543
(.1448)
1.7697
.0339
.1258 .0333 .9418
.5442 .0317 .9464
D-W
Table V
TESTS OF RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
Pound/Dollar Exchange Rate
Dependent
Equation Variable
Coefficient
on F
Constant t-l
Coefficient
on S
t-2 P
-- .0027
.4213 .0205
1.1545
.4521 .0206 .9761
.3977 .0211 .9756
S -F
t t-l
S -F
t t-l
S
t
V.1
V.2
V.3
V.4
SEE R2 D-W
-.0030
(.0034)
-.0022
(.0053)
.0239
(.0315)
.0236
(.0313)
.9652
(.0415)
1.0550
(.1615)
-.0880
(.1666)
Table VI
TEST STATISTICS
Estimated Value For
Test 95 Percent
Statistic Level I
X2(2)
X2 (3)
a=C=p=0, b=l X2(4)
1.96
5.99
7.81
9.49
Franc/
Pound
1922-26
0.970
1.22
4.31
4.32
Dollar/
Pound
1922-25
0.95
1.69
4.34
4.38
Mark/
Dollar
1973-77
-0.18
3.60
13.13
Lira/
Dollar
1973-77
0.23
0.50
3.33
Pound/
Dollar
1973-77
-0.88
10.57
11.66
17.54 9.16 11.60
Proposition
Tested
a = 0
a = p = 0
a=p, b=l
I
The Lira, 1973-1977: The Italian experience in the 1970's is in
some respects reminiscent of France in the 1920's. Italy's indexed wage
system makes the domestic inflation rate highly sensitive to the exchange
rate. The exchange rate in turn is sensitive to the rate of monetary
growth, which has for much of the period been tied to the financial needs
of the public sector. As in the case of France, the market has been fairly
successful in predicting these shifts, although the test in IV.4 comes
close to rejecting rational expectations.
The Pound Sterling: Recent British economic history with the various
phases of the social contract interacting with fiscal and monetary policy,
and external shocks is too complicated to summarize here. It has also
apparently been too much for the market. Prediction errors are strongly
serially correlated, and this leads to rejection of rational expectations
in Table VI.
Of the five exchange rates considered, then, we are unable to reject
rational expectations for three -- although the lira is near the edge -- but
are clearly able to reject it for the remaining two. Since the hypothesis
of rational expectations is attractive and has proved productive in economic
modeling, however, we are naturally inclined to ask whether there is any
way to save it in these cases. There would appear to be three main lines
of defense: risk aversion, low probability events, and learning. Let us
consider each of these in turn.
(i) Risk aversion: The tests of rationality developed in Section I
made the obviously untrue assumption of risk-neutrality; the assumption
cannot be literally true, for if it were, there wouldn't be any need for a
forward market. But the implications of risk aversion are unclear. Both
buyers and sellers of a forward currency are taking gambles, so the sign
of a risk premium is indeterminate. We might relax the tests by allowing
a constant risk premium, i.e., allowing the constant to differ from zero.
But the rationality of the mark and pound markets in the 1970's is still
rejected.
(ii) Low probability events: One well-known difficulty in testing
the efficiency of markets is that market participants may have been con-
cerned with the possibility of some unlikely but drastic event which did
not, in the event, actually occur. The familiar example is the persistent
discount on the Mexican peso, which was finally justified by the devalua-
tion in 1976. In this kind of situation one may be led to reject rational
expectations even when it is valid. From an econometric point of view,
what this problem does is to make tests of the kind carried out in this
paper valid only for very large samples; samples of 30-60 months may be
quite inadequate.
There doesn't seem to be any rigorous way of dealing with this problem.
The best we can do is ask for each case whether there was a low-probability,
drastic event that the market can plausibly have been concerned about. In
contrast to the case of Germany in the 1920's, considered below, where the
possibility of stabilization can plausibly be asserted to have influenced
behavior, there are no obvious candidates for Germany and Britain in the
1970's. Also, it is hard to see why the problem should be greater for those
currencies than the others considered.
(iii) Learning: As Lucas (1976) has emphasized, rational expectations
is an equilibrium concept which applies only when the market has had time
to become accustomed to the economic environment. In the period following
a structural change, such as a transition from fixed to floating exchange
rates, we might be able to reject the rationality of the forward market
without there having been any unexploited profit opportunities given the
information available to market participants. A suggestive piece of
evidence is that rational expectations looks best for the cases in which
monetary policy was dominated by a single consideration: the return to
gold in 1920's Britain, revenue needs in 1920's France and, to a lesser
extent, 1970's Italy.
While there may not have been any unexploited profits, however, this
is not the same as saying that we are free to apply rational expectations
models of the conventional kind. Little is known about the behavior of
markets engaged in a learning process, but there is no reason why they
should behave much like models of markets in which participants are assumed
to know the structure of the economy.1 And there is not even any assurance
that the process will converge.
To summarize: while the rational expectations hypothesis fares very
well for 1920's data and reasonably well for the lira in the 1970's, for
the other recent episodes it can be rejected. The most attractive explanation
of this rejection is that the markets are still engaged in a learning pro-
cess; but this leaves unclear how we should model these markets.
Some of the problems of interpreting rational expectations when markets
are learning are discussed in Schiller (1975).
III. A Special Case: The Forward Market in Hyperinflation
The tests of rationality developed in Section I were approximate
tests, where the approximation depends on the uncertainty about the spot
exchange rate not being too large. There have been a number of attempts,
however, to apply rational expectations to hyperinflations, in which the
uncertainty about next month's exchange rate can be very large indeed.1
This presents special problems. In this section I illustrate these prob-
lems by a consideration of the German hyperinflation 1921-1923.
We can begin by applying the same set of tests to hyperinflation.
Germany as were applied to the other countries studied. The results are
reported in Table VII. They are very unfavorable to the rational expec-
tations hypothesis. There was a large bias, with the forward market ap-
parently persistently underestimating depreciation. Prediction errors
were highly serially correlated, and correlated with the forward rate as
well. All tests indicate rejection of rational expectations.2
It should be noted that these results are in conflict with the con-
clusions reached by Frenkel (1976). Frenkel carried out a test similar
to that reported as VII.3, an ordinary least squares regression of the log
of the forward rate. Although the coefficient on the forward rate was, as
here, significantly greater than one, Frenkel attributed this to transaction
costs and "normal backwardation." Emphasizing that the residuals were not
serially correlated, he took his results as favorable evidence for the rational
expectations hypothesis. The results here indicate that he misinterpreted
Rational expectations models of hyperinflation include Sargent and Wallace
(1975) and Frenkel (1976).
The four test statistics, corresponding to those in Table VI, were 3.02,
19.40, 40.18, and 41.06.
Table VII
TESTS OF RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS:
Mark/Pound Exchange Rate, Feb. 1921 - Sept. 1923
Dependent
Equation Variable
VII.1
VII.2
VII. 3
VII.4
S -F
t t-1
S - Ft
S
t
Constant
.3979
(.1317)
.6075
(.3372)
-.9289
(.3139)
-1.2365
(.4762)
Coefficient
on Ft1
Coefficient
on St-2-2 P SEE R2
.7451 -- 0.8834
.6510 .6688
1.1537
(.0340)
0.9737
(.1986)
.2263
(.2321)
.0637 .5737 .9771
.2533 .5903 .9767
D-W
the evidence. The bias in the forward rate was 40 percent per month,
far too much for transactions costs and "normal backwardation" to explain.
But in any case tests on the logarithms of forward and spot rates can
only be valid if uncertainty about the spot rate is small. As the standard
errors of the equations reported in Table VII show, this was not the case
in hyperinflation Germany. We need to develop a test that is valid what-
ever the degree of uncertainty.
It was suggested in Section I that an appropriate test might be to
look at the expected real profit on a contract. Let Pt be the (uncertain)
price level in Germany when a forward contract comes due. Recalling the
definition of expected mark profits from Section I, the expected real
profit on a contract would be
E[SRt/Pt] - E[FRt-/Pt], so that the condition for zero expected profit is
(6) E[SRt/Pt] = E[FRt-_/Pt],
with both expectations taken conditional on information available at time
t-l.
There will be a corresponding condition if profits are taken in
dollars:
(7) E[1/SR )/P*] = E[1/FR )/P*]t t t t
where P* is the U.S. price level. Will these conditions be consistent with
one another? They will be consistent in an important case: when purchasing
power parity holds. If we can write the equation
We can more easily understand how an equation with a slope coefficient
"close" to one can be consistent with strongly biased [continued on next page]
Footnote continued from preceding page:
prediction and serially correlated prediction errors by looking at
the following diagram:
In RR - 1-09 In FR
-1
Time
Over time, the forward rate and the spot rate both grew, but
the forward rate less. This caused large underpredictions even though
the slopes were not very different, because of the huge growth. By
allowing the slope coefficient in his regression to differ from one,
Frenkel allowed it to "soak up" these prediction errors.
-1
(8) SRt = KPt/P*
t t
where K is an arbitrary constant, equations (7) and (8) imply each other.'
The reason for this is that a world of purchasing power parity is ef-
fectively a one-good world, so that there is a unique definition of real
profits.
When purchasing power parity holds, then, we can in principle test
the rationality of expectations by using tests based on (7) or (8). Before
proceeding to the empirical application of this result, which involves
certain additional difficulties, it may be useful to look at a numerical
example to see how various tests of rational expectations relate to one
another. Table VIII considers a case in which there are two states of the
world, which have equal probability of occuring. Prices are assumed known
with certainty in the U.S., and the forward rate is such that the expected
real profit on a forward contract is zero. A test on either the mark/dollar
exchange rate or its log will tend to show the market underpredicting the
future spot rate. Notice, however, that because U.S. prices are assumed
certain a test on the dollar/mark rate would show unbiased expectations.
To implement tests based on real profits empirically, we first need
to assure ourselves that purchasing power parity holds. A regression of
the log of the mark/pound exchange rate on the log of the ratio of German
to U.K. wholesale prices produces the equation listed as IX.1 in Table IX.
The coefficient on prices is close to, although significantly different from,
one. The large standard error, which has a percentage interpretation
We have E[SR/P t] = E[FRt /Pt] and SRt = KPt/P*. Substituting,
E[K/P*] = E[KFRtI/SRtP*]. But since neither K nor FRt_1 are random
variables, we can multiply by 1/KFR to derive E[(1/FRt)/P*l = E[(1/SRt)/P*].t-l t-l t [ )
Table VIII
FORWARD MARKET UNDER PURCHASING POWER PARITY,
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
State of World . I II
Probability 0.5 0.5
Exchange Rate, 0.5 1.5
Dollars/Mark
Exchange Rate 2.0 2/3
Marks/Dollar
Price Level in U.S. 1.0 1.0
Price Level in 2.0 2/3
Germany
Forward rate, marks/dollar = 1.0
Expected spot rate, marks/dollar = 4/3
Log of forward rate = 0.0
Expected log of spot rate = 0.144
Table IX
FURTHER TESTS ON GERMANY
In SR = -.3820 + 0.9804 In(P/P*)
(.0302) (.0041)
IX. 1
SEE = 0.1714 R2 = 0.9992 D-W = 0.6766
FRtI/SRt = 0.7986
(.0637)
SEE = .3601 D-W = 1.3535
FR t_/SR = 0.8941
(.0539)
SEE = .2640 D-W = 1.9618
FR t/SR = 0.5883
(.1650)
D-W = 0.8744
IX. 2
IX. 3
IX. 4
SEE = .4950
Notes to Table IX: These equations have the following interpretations:
IX.1: SR = exchange rate, marks/dollar
P = German wholesale price index
P* = U.S. wholesale price index
The equation was estimated on monthly data, January 1920 to December 1923,
from the International Abstract of Economic Statistics, 1919-1930.
IX.2: SR = exchange rate, marks/pound sterling
FR = forward exchange rate, pound sterling
The equation is estimated on data for the last week of each month from
February 1921 to September 1923. Data is from Einzig (1937).
IX.3 and IX.4: Same as IX.2, IX.3 is estimated for January 1921 to
December 1922; IX.3 for January - September 1923.
because of the log linear form somewhat compromises this result, however.
It indicates that there were large fluctuations in relative goods prices,
so that the assumption of a one-good world may not be appropriate.
Putting this difficulty on one side, however, let us proceed to
test rational expectations as if purchasing power parity held. Here we
run into a data difficulty. Our exchange rate numbers are end of month,
but price data comes in monthly averages. Under hyperinflation conditions
this can obviously make an important difference. There is an easy way
out, however, If one of the currencies in the forward contract is relatively
stable in real value, an approximately correct test for rationality would
be that expected profits measured in the stable currency be zero. That is,
if SR, FR are spot and forward rates in marks/pound, and the pound was
fairly stable in value (as it was), an approximate test is
(9) E[l/SRt] = 1/FRt-1
Since errors in (9) are unlikely to have constant variance, it seems
preferable to think of the test as being of the equivalent proposition
(10) E(FRt_ 1 /SRt] = 1
We might note that if (10) were true, we would also have In{E[FRt_ /SRt]} = 0.
Comparing this with the prediction error In SR - In FRt, and remembering
t t-1
that minus log is a convex function, we can see that we would expect to
find a positive average prediction error.
A test of (10) is reported in equation IX.2 in Table IX. The mean
error is not as dramatic as in Table VII, but we can still clearly reject
the hypothesis of unbiasedness. The bias, of 20 percent per month, is
still far too large to ascribe to risk or transaction costs.
Thus even when the forward market in marks is tested in a way that
allows for large uncertainty, rational expectations does not stand up.
Is there any way to salvage rational expectations? Two possibilities
suggest themselves:
(i) Purchasing power risk: As pointed out above, the large standard
error in equation IX.1 indicates that relative prices of German and foreign
goods changed a good deal. In fact, the month-to-month uncertainty about
relative goods prices must have been of the same order of magnitude as the
uncertainty about the exchange rate. As a result, the tests are still
subject to some bias. But the result in IX.2 can be looked at in a more
literal way, which makes this an unconvincing explanation: IX.2 says
that a British investor could have sold marks forward and earned an average
20 percent per month in pounds per pound of the contract.
(ii) Low probability events: A better defense of the market's
rationality is to argue that the forward rate was kept below the spot rate,
especially in the later stages, by the possibility of stabilization.1 It
is certainly true that the estimated bias is largely due to a series of
large underpredictions in 1923. Equations IX.3 and IX.4 split the sample
into two sub-samples, February 1921 - December 1922 and January - September
1923. It is apparent that looking at the first period alone gives a much
more favorable result for rational expectations.
So it is at least possible that the bias in the forward rate was
the result of market expectations of a stabilization; that the market
correctly assessed the chances that the stabilization would occur; but
that since we don't actually happen to. observe a stabilization in our
This possibility, and the difficulties it poses for testing market
efficiency, were pointed out to me by Bill Krasker.
sample, expectations appear biased. Alternatively, speculators may just
not have been able to believe in the magnitude of the depreciation (the
forward discount never exceeded 36 percent per month). It is not clear
how we might be able to tell the difference.
In this section, then, I have examined the problem of testing the
rationality of the forward market in hyperinflation. The problem of
uncertainty has a theoretically correct solution when purchasing power
parity holds, and a workable approximate solution if one of the currencies
has a fairly stable value. But the problem of low-probability events,
in the form of stabilization, makes rational expectations ultimately
untestable in the case studied.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
This paper began by noting that during periods of floating exchange
rates there has been a widespread belief that speculation in the exchange
markets plays a disruptive role, presumably because of irrational behavior
on the part of speculators. The verdict of the empirical tests is ambiguous.
During the 1920's speculation in the dollar and the franc seems to have
been rational; special circumstances make the rationality of speculation
in the mark hard to test. More recently, however, the forward market does
not seem to have done so well. Only for the lira do we fail to reject
rationality; the forward markets in the pound sterling and the mark have
clearly done badly.
There does appear, then, to be some justification for central banks'
distrust of private speculation in the exchange markets.
REFERENCES
Frankel, J. (1977): "All About Exchange Rates," Unpublished Manuscript.
Frenkel, J. A. (1976): "A Monetary Approach to the Exchange Rate:
Doctrinal Aspects and Empirical Evidence," Scandinavian Journal of
Economics, 78, No. 2.
Isard, P. (1977): "The Process of Exchange Rate Determination: A Survey
of Important Models and Major Issues," International Finance Discus-
sion Paper No. 101, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Kouri, P. J. K. (1976): "The Exchange Rate and the Balance of Payments
in the Short Run and the Long Run: A Monetary Approach," Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 78, No. 2.
Lucas, R. (1976): "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique," in
Brunner and Meltzer (eds.), The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets
(Amsterdam: North-Holland).
McCulloch, J. H. (1975): "Risk, Interest, and Forward Exchange: Comment,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 89, No. 1 (February).
Mussa, M. (1976): "The Exchange Rate, the Balance of Payments, and
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Under a Regime of Controlled Floating,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 78, No. 2.
Nurkse, R. (1944): International Currency Experience, League of
Nations.
Roper, D. E. (1975): "Risk, Interest, and Forward Exchange: Comment,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 89, No. 1 (February).
Sargent, T. J. and N. Wallace (1974): "Rational Expectations and the
Dynamics of Hyperinflation," International Economic Review, 14
(September).
Schiller, R. (1975): "Rational Expectations and the Dynamic Structure of
Macroeconomic Models," Unpublished Manuscript.
Siegel, J. (1975): "Risk, Interest, and Forward Exchange: Response,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 89, No. 1 (February).
Theil, H. (1971): Principles of Econometrics (New York: John Wiley).
ESSAY III
ARE FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES STABLE?
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY
Introduction
The case against flexible exchange rates has always rested in large
part on the argument that speculation in the exchange markets can destabilize
an otherwise stable economy. This argument passes through cycles of popu-
larity. It was widely accepted a generation ago, fell out of favor in the
postwar period, and has recently regained currency under the name of the
"vicious circle" hypothesis.1 Proponents of flexible rates have generally
argued in opposition that profitable speculation always works with, not
against, the underlying causes of exchange rate movements. This counter-
argument is formalized in models in which market expectations are assumed
to be "rational."2
One might have expected the recent transition to a system of floating
rates to settle the question, but events have conspired to make it difficult
to draw conclusions on the basis of recent experience. The consequences of
floating rates since 1973 are difficult to disentangle from the effects of
1The doctrine of the "vicious circle of prices and exchange rates," though
widely discussed, has not at the time of writing made its way into the
journals. The best-known exposition of the doctrine was in a speech by
Bernard Clappier at the IMF Meeting in Manila, 1975. A brief discussion
of the concept appears in the Economic Report of the President, 1977.
2Many authors have applied rational expectations to exchange rates. A
short list would include Black (1973), Mussa (1976), Kouri (1976), Dornbusch
(1976). Other papers are discussed in the survey by Isard (1977).
the increase in commodity prices and the recession of 1974-76. Furthermore,
government intervention in and regulation of markets in countries experiencing
exchange depreciation has been extensive, further obscuring the evidence
on how markets function.1
In this paper I reconsider the stability of floating exchange rates
from a theoretical and empirical standpoint. The paper is organized in
two parts. In the first part I review the theoretical arguments about
exchange stability. A simple monetary model is developed, and it is
shown that the stability of the exchange rate depends crucially on how
speculators form expectations about future exchange depreciation. If they
extrapolate from past depreciation, instability is quite possible. But it
may be difficult to distinguish on the basis of casual observation between
an economy suffering from an unstable speculative run and one in which
speculators are acting rationally in the face of anticipated monetary ex-
pansion. I then consider the effects of lags in price adjustment on
stability, and show that they can make the exchange rate either more or
less stable, depending on where they arise.
The second part of the paper gives some empirical underpinnings to
the argument by examining in detail a particular case in which exchange
depreciation has often been alleged to have destabilized an economy: France
in the 1920's. There are several reasons for choosing this episode. First,
the evidence is relatively "clean"; the problems in interpreting recent
experience discussed above can be avoided. Second, the French experience
is of doctrinal importance, for it was Exhibit A in the classic indictment
1For a discussion of policy under floating rates in five industrial countries,
see Black (1977).
of flexible exchange rates by Nurkse (1944). Third, the French experience
was one in which causation (in some sense; I will return to this point)
seems to have run from exchange speculation to domestic events.1 Finally,
the large depreciation and inflation stopped short of hyperinflation,
which may allow us to learn more about the structure of the economy than
is possible when monetary events are more violent.2
The study of France in the 1920's sheds a good deal of light on the
theoretical issues raised in Part I of the paper. A simple monetary
model of the exchange rate turns out to be a much better approximation to
behavior than earlier studies of the episode might have led one to suppose.
There is some evidence of slow adjustment of prices, but the lags are not,
apparently, very long.
On the question of stability, I find that, just as theory suggested,
the evidence is consistent both with destabilizing speculative runs and
with rational behavior in anticipation of monetary expansion. But the
latter is both a more attractive hypothesis and more reasonable in the
historical context, so that we can argue that on balance the evidence is
that exchange speculation did not independently destabilize the economy.
For the alleged causal role of speculation, see Dulles (1929), Nurkse
(1944) and Aliber (1962).
2 In his study of depreciation and inflation in Germany, Frenkel (1976)
writes that "the rapid developments occuring during the hyperinflation
prevented a detailed analysis of the channels of transmission among the
various sectors of the economy."
I. Expectations, Exchange Depreciation, and Inflation
A. Stylized Facts
There have been two major episodes of floating exchange rates in
this century: the period of inconvertibility following the First World
War, and the continuing period of floating following the breakdown of the
Smithsonian agreement in 1973. A review of macroeconomic behavior in the
two episodes1 suggests several "stylized facts" about flexible exchange
rates which we would like theoretical models to respect. We will see
further evidence on these points later, but for the time being I will simply
assert the following:
(i) Over the long run -- which means here no more than a few years,
since that is as long as the interwar experience with floating rates lasted
-- there is a reasonably close agreement between money supplies and prices,
on the one hand, and between relative inflation and exchange depreciation,
on the other. So the central "monetary approach" propositions of purchasing
power parity and the quantity theory of money are confirmed for the long
run (or more accurately, the medium run).
(ii) As a short run matter speculation plays an important role in
exchange rate determination. Large current exchange rate movements can
be produced by expectations of future exchange depreciation. This suggests,
though it does not prove, a high degree of substitutability and mobility of
securities denominated in different currencies. It is also evident that
Empirical studies of European countries in the 1920's include Keynes
(1924), Young (1925), Dulles (1929), Graham (1930), Tsiang (1959), and
Aliber (1962).
owners of securities actively consider the possibility of future changes
in parity when allocating their wealth.
(iii) Also in the short run, casual observation suggests stickiness
of some prices. Wages in particular appear to move sluggishly, retail
prices less so, wholesale prices least. As a result, there are substantial
deviations of the exchange rate from many measures of purchasing power
parity in the short run. PPP appears, however, to be gradually restored
following a disturbance.
Wholesale Prices in Gold
1913 or 1914 = 100
France U.K. U.S. Germany Italy Belgium
Coeff. Highest/
of Var. Lowest
1926 119 154 143 134 132 122 .098 1.29
1927 128 149 137 138 140 122 .070 1.22
1928 129 146 140 140 134 123 .062 1.19
1929 126 139 138 137 130 123 .051 1.13
Source: Statistique Generale de la France (1932).
1
This assertion may need some explanation and documentation. Suppose we
were to take price indices for a number of countries with a common pre-
war base year, and adjust by exchange rates to put them into a common unit
of account, such as gold. PPP doctrine would then assert that these price
indices in gold should be equal. A long-run PPP doctrine would argue that
under conditions of monetary stability these indices tend to converge.
The table above presents evidence that this did, in fact, occur. It gives
wholesale price indices in gold with 1913 or 1914 = 100 for six countries
from 1926-29, and computes two measures of their dispersion, the coefficient
of variation, and the ratio of the highest to the lowest. By either measure,
there was a marked reduction in dispersion during those years, lending support
to a long-run purchasing-power-parity doctrine.
The long-run behavior of exchange rates, then, is easily understood
in a monetarist framework. Speculation and the possibility of instability
can also be readily introduced into a simple monetary model. Sticky
prices pose a greater problem of analysis, however, since different
stories about price adjustment which seem equally plausible can produce
quite different behavior.
The approach I will take here is one of postponing difficulties. I
will begin by developing a simple monetary model of exchange rates, and
analyze the conditions under which real or apparent instability can develop.
Only at that point will the complications of slow price adjustment be
introduced, and their implications for the stability of the exchange rate
be considered.
B. A Monetary Model of Exchange Rates
Much of the literature on speculation and instability in a monetary
economy is based on the classic study of hyperinflation by Cagan (1956).
Cagan's theoretical apparatus was designed with a closed economy in mind,
even through his empirical analysis focused on fairly open economies; but
under some special assumptions which Cagan himself made his analysis
carries over unchanged to an open economy with a floating exchange rate.
The crucial assumptions are that real output is exogenously given and
that wealth does not affect the demand for money. If rigidity of prices
or wages causes monetary shocks to have real effects, the exchange rate
The model developed in this section follows closely the models of
Bilson (1976) and Frenkel (1976).
becomes a real as well as a monetary variable and it is necessary to
turn to the Keynesian analysis of Mundell (1961) and Fleming (1962).
More subtly, if wealth affects the demand for money, the evolution of
the exchange rate will depend on the balance of payments on current account
as well as on expected inflation and the quantity of money.1
If we suppress these potential complications by assuming full employ-
ment and a pure transactions demand for money, Cagan's hyperinflation model
can be reinterpreted as a model of a floating exchange rate. We begin
with a demand function for money:
(1) m - p = k + Ey - Xr E, X > 0
where m is the log of the nominal money supply, p the log of the domestic
price level, y the log of real income (assumed exogenously given) and r
the interest rate. The economy is assumed to be linked to the rest of the
world by both trade and capital movements -- that is, there is arbitrage
in both the goods market and the securities market. In both cases, the
arbitrage is assumed to be perfect. In the goods market this means that
we have purchasing power parity:
(2) s = p - p
where s is the log of the exchange rate, domestic currency for foreign
and p is the foreign price level. In the securities market we have the
corresponding conditions of interest parity:
(3) r = r +
An elegant model of wealth effects and the exchange rate is that of
Kouri (1976).
where r is the foreign interest rate and 6 the expected rate of depre-
ciation of domestic currency.
Equations (1) - (3) can be solved to yield a "pseudo" reduced form
expression for the exchange rate:
(4) s = - k - p - y + Xr + m + 6
This is not a true reduced form in the econometrician's sense, because
not all the variables on the right hand side can properly be regarded
as exogenous. For a country small in world goods and asset markets, p
and r can reasonably be considered given, but neither m nor 6 can be
treated as exogenous. As we will see, in France during the 1920's the
situation of the government budget led to a short-run dependence of the
money supply on the interest rate, which for expositional purposes can
be represented as a simple supply function:
(5) m = m + r P > 0
In this case it is the shift parameter in the money supply function, m,
which should be regarded as exogenous.
Most important for an analysis of stability, however, is the deter-
mination of 6. In the next section I turn to some simple hypotheses about
how speculators form expectations and their implications.
C. Exchange Rate Expectations: AD HOC Formulations
To complete the model we need to know how the market forms an expec-
tation about the rate of depreciation, 6. Much of the discussion of exchange
rate behavior involves some sort of ad hoc formulation in which investors
form expectations about future exchange rates on the basis of past ex-
change rates in some plausible way. Two popular hypotheses are that:
(i) Investors regard some particular exchange rate as normal, and
expect the rate to move back toward that normal level;
(ii) Investors extrapolate from past depreciation to predict future
depreciation.
I examine a version of each of these hypotheses, which we can call
"regressive" and "extrapolative" expectations, respectively, reserving a
discussion of the more sophisticated hypothesis of "rational" expectations
for the next section.
1. Regressive expectations: We suppose that the market always has
in mind a normal exchange rate, G, toward which it expects the actual
rate to move. The expected rate of depreciation can be written
(6) 6 = A (o - s) A > 0
S S
Clearly, as long as the market's idea of what rate is normal doesn't
change, speculation will not lead to any cumulative process of depreciation.
Indeed, the effect of speculation will be to reduce the impact of shocks on
the exchange rate. We can substitute into the reduced form (4) to derive
the expression:
(7) s = [1/(l + A)] [- k - y + m + r + XA o]
S s
from which it can be seen that the effects of all factors on the exchange
rate are dampened.
2. Extrapolative expectations: Matters look quite different when
the market extrapolates from post currency depreciation. Suppose, now,
that the expected rate of depreciation, 6, is gradually adjusted in the
direction of the actual rate, so that, introducing time subscripts, we
have:
(8) 6t - 6t_ = [(s t - st- 1 ) - 6t_1 ]
or St = @(st - st_1 ) + (1 - )6t_-1
Substituting back into (4), and now also taking account of the endogenous
money supply as represented in (5), we can derive the result that actual
depreciation is proportional to the change in the expected rate of depre-
ciation:
(9) s- st- = (X + ) [ t - t_]
But actual depreciation feeds back into expectations, and there is
no guarantee the process is stable. From (8) and (9) we have
(10) 6t = z t-1
1 - 6 - 6(A + 9)
where Z = 1 - 8(X + P)
Obviously, (10) will be unstable if IZI > 1. There are two cases of
instability:
1(i) If [1 + 2(X + p)] > 1 > 8(X + I1), there will be oscillations(i) I2
of increasing size around 6 = 0. It is hard to attach much economic
meaning to this case, which would not occur if we had worked, as Cagan
(1956) did, in continuous time. 1
(ii) Of more significance is the case when O(X + p) > 1, so that
Z > 1. In that case, 6 will explode, with depreciation inducing expecta-
tions of further depreciation, causing a cumulative "flight from the currency."
It is worth looking at this case more closely. The path of the expected
rate of depreciation, from (10), will be exponential:
(11) 6t+i = '6 t
The exchange rate will depreciate at an accelerating rate. Let s
be the solution for s when 6 = 0. Then the exchange rate will depreciate
according to
(12) st+i- s = Z (s - s)
Extrapolative expectations, then, create the possibility of instability.
An unstable speculative run is more likely, the faster expectations adjust;
the greater the sensitivity of money demand to the interest rate; and the
more accommodating the monetary authority, as measured by P. As we will
see below, stability can also depend on the way prices lag behind the
money supply and/or the exchange rate.
D. Rational Expectations
An important objection to hypotheses about expectations like those
considered in the last section is that in such formulations investors are
Cagan did, however, use a discrete time formulation for empirical work;
as a result, his tests of stability are not strictly valid.
assumed to hold beliefs about the future course of exchange rates which
are in fact incorrect. During a speculative run of the kind represented
by equations (11) and (12), for example, the actual rate of depreciation
will always exceed the expected rate. An increasingly popular alternative
to such ad hoc hypotheses argues that investors will be as well-informed
as the economist modeling them, so that their predictions are the same as
those of the model. The hypothesis of "rational expectations" would imply
that, except at those moments when the market has just received new infor-
mation,1 the expected rate of depreciation is the same as the actual rate.
Note that the relevant period is from the purchase of a security until it
comes due, so that if 6 is the expected one-period rate of depreciation,
we have:
(13) 6t = St+l 
- st
But we have already noted that st+l - st = (X + ) [6t+l - 6t],' so
the expected rate of depreciation will follow an exponential path:
(14) 6 = l+X+ 6t+1 + t
Since the coefficient on 6t is greater than one, like the case of
unstable extrapolative expectations, the rational expectations model ap-
pears to exhibit knife-edge instability. Unless the initial expected rate
of depreciation is zero, (14) implies explosive divergence.
In this paper I deal with uncertainty by assuming that individuals make
plans as if they were perfectly certain about the future. When new infor-
mation becomes available, they revise their plans, but again plan as if
they were certain. For the purposes of this paper an explicit consideration
of uncertainty would complicate the exposition without making much difference.
But nothing has so far determined the initial value of 6. In fact,
we may argue that if investors do not believe in the possibility of indefinite
speculative bubbles, the initial value of 6, and hence also of the exchange
rate, will be determined precisely by the requirement that the subsequent
path of the economy converge to equilibrium.1 Thus, we assume that 6 = 0
unless the equilibrium exchange rate is itself changing, so that speculation
never acts as an independent destabilizing force. The rational expecta-
tions approach may be regarded as a formal statement of the argument of
Keynes (1924) that "the successful speculator makes his profit by antici-
pating, not by modifying, existing economic tendencies," under the assump-
tion that speculators are, as a rule, successful.
Rationality of expectations does not, however, mean that exchange
rates cannot be volatile. If the underlying variables determining the
equilibrium rate shift around, so will the actual rate. The most important
of these is of course the money supply function. Furthermore, expectations
of future changes in the exchange rate can affect the current rate. An
important implication of the model is that under rational expectations the
behavior of exchange markets in response to an anticipated monetary expan-
sion can appear on casual inspection to be destabilizing. Suppose, in
particular, that investors come to believe that the monetary authority
will alter its behavior at some future date, increasing the supply of
money at any given interest rate. This will lead to a current depreciation
of the currency and then to continuing depreciation and rising domestic
prices in a sequence of events quite similar to what one would expect to
1 For a justification of this assumption, see Brock (1975).
observe in an irrational "flight from the currency" of the kind discussed
above.
The way such a depreciation would work may be examined more carefully
if we solve for the path of the exchange rate under rational expectations.
Let s be the exchange rate which would obtain if no depreciation were
expected, i.e., the solution of (4) and (5) when 6 = 0. For expectations
to be fulfilled, any path for the exchange rate must obey the difference
equation
(15) s = s + (s t  S)t+l + P t
As long as the underlying factors determining s are not expected to change,
the only path which obeys (15) and does not involve unlimited "tulipmania"
is where s is stationary at s. This is illustrated by point A in Figure I.
Now suppose that at time t new information leads investors to expect
a monetary expansion at a later date, say t + T, which will increase the
equilibrium exchange rate, say to that depicted as point C. Then we know
that after t + T the economy will be at the new equilibrium.
But the exchange rate must not be expected to make a discrete jump
at t + T. If it were to jump, that would involve a windfall capital gain,
something ruled out by arbitrage. Any jump in s over and above that allowed
by the arbitrage condition (15) must come at the moment when the information
available to the market changes, that is, at time t. The path of the
economy thereafter must be one which arrives at C at time t + T without
there having been any further windfall capital gains.
In Figure I, such a path would involve an initial jump in s to a
point like B, then gradual further depreciation to C. (As Brock (1975) has
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shown for a closed economy, all adjustment to an anticipated monetary
expansion must take place before the expansion itself takes place.)
The size of the initial jump to B is determined by the necessity that
the time taken to traverse BC be exactly T periods.
The important point to note is how much a depreciation in anticipa-
tion of monetary expansion looks like a destabilizing speculative run.
Along BC the behavior of the expected rate of depreciation and the exchange
rate are described by (14) and (15), which are identical in form to the
process of depreciation described by (10). One might easily imagine
that an observer could misinterpret the sequence of events, or that an
econometrician might get a good fit with an extrapolative model even
where it was inappropriate. I will argue that something along these lines
has occurred in the interpretation of events in France in the 1920's.
Is there any way to distinguish empirically between "rational" depre-
ciations in anticipation of monetary expansion and extrapolative expectations?
If we can directly observe expectations in the form of forward contracts,
there is a simple test: in a speculative run investors will make persistent
prediction errors; in a rational depreciation they will not.
E. Lags in Price Adjustment
The discussion of stability to this point has been confined to a model
in which prices are assumed to adjust instantaneously to clear markets.
This may seem an unrealistic assumption to make in a short-run context.
Nor is it a harmless simplification, if it is wrong, for as Dornbusch (1976)
has argued, slow adjustment of prices can make a great deal of difference
to the behavior of exchange rates. Unfortunately, it is not easy to
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determine just what kind of difference it makes, since whether slow price
adjustment stabilizes or destabilizes the exchange rate depends on the
nature of the lag. If the lag is principally a lag of prices behind
the exchange rate, the effect will be destabilizing.
We can illustrate this point by comparing the monetary model of
this part of the paper with an extreme Keynesian model in which prices
are entirely rigid.1 Such a model would substitute variations in output
for variations in domestic prices. Let us assume that the economy can be
represented by the following model:
(16) Y = C(Y) + I + T(s - p, Y) (goods market)
0 < C1 < i, T1 > 0, T2 < 0
(17) m - p = L(Y, r) (money market)
L1 > 0, L2 < 0
(18) r = r + 6 (capital mobility)
where
Y = real output
C = real consumption
I = investment, treated as exogenous
T = trade balance, measured in domestic goods
s = log of exchange rate
In the appendix to this part of the paper I show that introducing
gradual price adjustment does not alter the conclusions.
p = log of domestic price level, assumed fixed
m = log of money supply
r = domestic interest rate
r = foreign interest rate
6= expected rate of depreciation
We can examine the stability of this economy under the assumption of
extrapolative expectations, which I will represent in continuous time
here to simplify the analysis:
(19) 6 = A6 (s - 6) A > 0
In this model, as in the earlier model, expectations of future
depreciation will induce current depreciation, a process which can be
explosive. If it is to be stable, depreciation must work sufficiently
powerfully through the trade balance and thence through increased real
income to raise the interest rate. The necessary and sufficient condition
for stability is A * (- ) LC1 - T1 < 1. This compares with
a stability condition under flexible prices and purchasing power parity of
am
A6 (- ~) < 1. The rigid-price model may be either more or less stable
than the flexible price model.
Whether it is less stable depends on the strength of the stabilizing
forces, in particular, the effect of the exchange rate or the trade balance.
If T1 is large, which is also a condition under which purchasing power
parity will remain a good approximation, rigidity of prices will have a
stabilizing effect. If it is small, sticky prices will make the economy
more prone to speculative runs.
Unfortunately, then, the plausible statement that prices adjust
slowly has ambiguous implications for the stability of a floating exchange
rate system. The effect depends both on the price elasticities of trade
flows and on the multiplier effect of the trade balance on income,
both of which are notoriously hard to pin down empirically.
F. Summary
In this part of the paper I have examined the question of exchange
stability in the context of a monetary model of exchange rates which
draws upon the work of Cagan (1956) and Brock (1975). From this model,
and some extensions to situations in which prices do not adjust instantaneously,
four major conclusions emerge:
(i) If expectations about future exchange rates are regressive, the
economy is always stable.
(ii) The possibility of instability arises when investors extrapolate
from past exchange rate changes, creating the possibility of a cumulative
process of flight from the currency.
(iii) The likelihood of instability given extrapolative expectations
depends on the structure of the economy and the behavior of the monetary
authority as well as the speed with which expectations adjust.
(iv) Finally, if expectations are formed rationally, the economy is
always stable. But rational expectations are consistent with volatile
exchange rates. And it is possible under rational expectations for
speculation to play a leading role in a chronological sense in a process
of inflation and monetary expansion, which may make it difficult to dis-
tinguish between a "rational" depreciation in anticipation of a change in
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monetary policy and an irrational flight from the currency arising from
extrapolative expectations.
These results come from a particular model; but their special
character should not be overemphasized. They look, instead, as if they
should be quite generally true.
APPENDIX TO PART I
STABILITY IN A KEYNESIAN MODEL
In Section E of this part of the paper I dealt briefly with the
effects of sticky prices on exchange stability. The model used there
involved an assumption of completely rigid prices. I extend the analysis
here to the case of gradually adjusting prices.
Restating the model, we have:
(Al) Y = C(Y) + I + T(s - p, Y)
(A2) m - p = L(Y, r)
(A3) r = r +6
To this we add a simple price adjustment equation: we assume that
prices adjust gradually in the direction of the long-run equilibrium
price, p:
(A4) p = Ap(p - p)
If expectations are formed extrapolatively, we add to these equations the
expectations equation
(A5) 6 = A6 (s - 6)
To examine the stability of this system, we can linearize around
6 = 0 and the long-run equilibrium value of p, p, to derive the dynamic
system
p6 i
-A
p
B (- -- ) ( 71Z L1
1
0
-1
- B
p-p
6
where
B = 1+ A6L2/Z
LT I
1 - C1 
- T2
Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability are that the trace
of the matrix in (A6) be negative and its determinant positive. Both
will be satisfied if and only if B > 0, that is if
- A6L2/Z <
But this is the same stability condition derived in the case of the model
with completely rigid prices.
(A6)
II. Empirical Evidence: France in the 1920's
In Part I of this paper I showed that the stability of a flexible
exchange rate regime cannot be determined a priori: we need to know how
asset markets behave, and may need to know a good deal about the structure
of an economy and the behavior of the monetary authority, before we can
reach a conclusion about stability. I therefore turn to some empirical
evidence: an examination of the French experience with floating exchange
rates in the 1920's. This experience was regarded by Nurkse (1944) and
Aliber (1962) as one of the major examples of the instability of a
flexible rate regime. While the central concern of the analysis will
be with the question of stability, a number of other questions inevitably
arise, making this section into a fairly extensive investigation of the
working of an economy under flexible rates. The analysis is organized in
five sections. Section A gives an overview of monetary developments in
post-World War I france, and defines the issue of stability. Section B
is concerned with the role of prices in the process of depreciation. It
examines the usefulness of the purchasing-power-parity hypothesis, then
turns to the determination of domestic prices and wages. In Section C
the working of the foreign exchange market is considered, and some hypothe-
ses about it tested. Section D looks at the domestic monetary process,
both the demand for money and the determinants of its supply. Finally,
Section E pulls together the evidence and attempts to give a coherent
account of what happened in France in the twenties.
A. Overview
Without doing too much violence to the facts, one can divide the
monetary history of France in the 1920's into three distinct periods.
From soon after the unpegging of the franc in 1919 until late 1922, the
value of the franc was fairly stable. There was little speculation against
the franc; indeed, in the early postwar period the franc was generally
expected to appreciate. During 1923-26, however, the franc began depreciating
at a rate substantially in excess of current monetary expansion. There
were two sudden speculative "attacks" on the franc, in the winter of
1923-24 and the summer of 1926. At the height of the latter crisis a new
government was formed, which introduced a period of a stabilized exchange
rate which passed imperceptibly into the restoration of the gold standard
in 1928.
Some of the relevant statistics for 1920-27 are given in Table I.
It is apparent from columns (1) and (2) that depreciation and relative
inflation were of comparable size, although there was some tendence for
inflation to outstrip the exchange rate from 1920 to 1922, and the con-
verse thereafter.1 Columns (3) and (4) provide evidence on the willingness
of the public to hold francs. In the early postwar years, French interest
rates were lower than U.K. rates, but French securities nonetheless found
buyers because the depreciation of the franc was widely regarded as
temporary.2 This situation was reversed as investors began to expect
1
It should also be noted that the franc remained "undervalued" through-
out the 1920's if 1913 or 1914 prices are used to compute the purchasing
power parity.
2 Thus Keynes (1924), condemning the tendency of the French authorities
to blame their difficulties on speculation, asserted that during the
postwar years to that date there had been more speculation in favor of
the franc than against it.
Table I
FRENCH STATISTICS, 1920-1927
(1920 = 100)
(1)
Exchange Rate,
Francs/Pound
100.0
99.2
103.8
144.5
162.1
194.6
287.8
238.0
(2)
Purchasing
Power Par
100.0
107.3
126.2
161.2
177.8
208.5
288.7
263.3
(3)
Real Value of
Note Circulation
100.0
143.7
146.3
117.7
108.5
106.4
101.0
116.1
(4)
Bank Rate Parity
Against London
- 1.00
- 0.25
+ 1.46
+ 1.50
+ 2.08
+ 1.92
+ 1.67
+ 0.50
(1) Exchange rate, francs/U.K. pound.
Statistics, 1914-1940.
Source: Banking and Monetary
(2) Ratio of French to U.K. wholesale prices. Source: European
Historical Statistics.
(3) Ratio of note circulation to wholesale price index. Source: Ibid.
(4) Average annual excess of French over U.S. bank rate. Source: Einzig
(1937).
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
continuing depreciation of the franc. Then a combination of relatively
high interest rates in France and restrictions on export of capitalI were
necessary to make investors willing to hold franc-denominated securities.
This unwillingness to hold francs is also shown by the real value of note
circulation, which fell from 1922 on even though real output was rising.
This much is not a matter for dispute. The crucial question is,
what caused the change in expectations? Most writers on the French
experience, most notably Nurkse (1944) in his celebrated attack on
flexible exchange rates, have argued that exchange markets behaved in a
more or less irrational manner, and that France was the victim of a large-
scale speculative run. It is probably fair to regard this as the traditional
view. In this paper I will make a case for an alternative explanation,
that markets behaved in a rational manner, and that the change in expecta-
tions was a response to new information that led investors to believe that
future monetary expansion was likely.
The traditional account of the French experience, as developed by
Nurkse and elaborated by Aliber (1962) may be expressed schematically in
terms of the model of Part I. In the early postwar period, wrote Nurkse,
"there was a strong belief that the depreciation of European currencies
was a purely temporary phenomenon...and that these currencies would sooner
or later return to their pre-par parities." In short, expectations may be
The French government imposed a number of restrictions on the acquisition
of foreign assets, as described in Dulles (1929). It is evident that many
investors were able to avoid these restrictions by altering the location
of trade finance, accelerating repayment on foreign loans, and other
measures, including, Dulles reports, smuggling coins out of the country
in cheeses.
described as having been regressive, and thereby tending to stabilize
the currencies.1 As time passed without any tendency to return to pre-
war parity, however, the process by which expectations were formed was
revised, and the exchange market became dominated by extrapolative ex-
pectations, which destabilized the economy. "Anticipatory purchases of
foreign exchange tend to produce or at any rate to hasten the anticipated
fall in the exchange value of the national currency, and the actual fall
may set up or strengthen anticipations of a further fall."
Aliber (1962) elaborated further on the reasons why the French economy
was unstable, and though his paper avoids writing any explicit model he
stressed the lag of prices behind the exchange rate and the elasticity
of money supply with respect to the interest rate, corresponding to the
factors making for instability in the discussion of Part I.
What would an alternative explanation of the depreciation of the
franc look like? I will argue that much of the behavior of the markets in
France suggests that investors' expectations were not so much based on past
behavior of the franc as on the political situation. The key factor causing
movements in the exchange rate was political news altering the market's
beliefs about the extent to which the government was likely to meet its
financial difficulties by money creation. The relevant model in this
case, assuming that market anticipations were on average correct, would
be that of rational expectations, and in particular the case discussed
above in which the market expects future monetary expansion.
Nurkse argued that there were nonetheless forces tending to produce
continuing depreciation. Following Polak (1943), he argued (in modern
terminology) that imperfect substitutability between assets required that
currencies depreciate as external debt increased via current account
deficits.
It is not possible to settle which of these two views is more nearly
correct on the basis of casual observation. We need to know a good deal
of detail about how the French economy actually behaved during the period.
The questions which need to be answered are the following:
(i) Are the traditional assertions about the price mechanism
accurate? I.e., is it appropriate to dismiss a simple purchasing power
parity explanation of depreciation?
(ii) How did the asset markets actually behave? Can the formation
of expectations be represented by an extrapolative scheme; or were ex-
pectations "rational"?
(iii) Since in the end France did experience a large increase in the
money supply, what was the process through which this occurred?
In the discussion that follows I examine each of these points.
B. Price Behavior
An important aspect of much discussion of exchange rates is the
assertion that, while there is a long-run tendency for purchasing power
parity to hold, it does not hold in the short run. We would like to
know the extent to which the exchange rate can live a life of its own; how
significant are the deviations from purchasing power parity?
There are several ways one might go about assessing purchasing power
parity as a theory. One way to judge a theory is by how much it explains;
is the variance of the exchange rate when corrected by relative prices
much less than the variance of the exchange rate itself? Another, different
question to ask is whether the deviations from purchasing power parity are
systematic. E.g., are they white noise, or are they highly serially
correlated? As it turns out, PPP does well by the first criterion, but
less well by the second.
Before proceeding to test purchasing power parity, it is important
to be clear what PPP is. It is not a causal theory; in the monetary model
developed in Part I, neither the exchange rate nor the price level can
be regarded as a causal variable; rather, PPP is best viewed as an
arbitrage condition, part of a larger model. For purposes of statistical
testing, this means that we must be prepared to regard relative prices as
simultaneously determined, and to apply appropriate methods.
Table II reports the results of a number of tests of purchasing power
parity, using monthly British and French data for the period December 1921
to December 1926. Equations II.1 and 11.2 directly test the proposition
that exchange rate changes should be proportional to differential infla-
tion. In an equation of the form s = a + 8 (p - p ) where s is the
logarithm of the exchange rate, p the log of the domestic price level,
and p , the log of the foreign price level, PPP predicts 8 = 1. II.1 and
11.2 estimate this equation by instrumental variables, since ordinary
least squares would be subject to the problems of simultaneity mentioned
above. The problem of finding instruments is simplified by the fact that
p - p is strongly trended, so that a time trend will serve. In II.1
the purchasing power par is measured by wholesale prices, in 11.2 by
retail prices. When wholesale prices are used the value of 8 is not too
far from one; the results look less good when retail prices are used. We
cannot easily test whether the differences from one are significant,
however, since the Durbin-Watson statistics suggest fairly high serial
correlation in the residuals.
Table II
TESTS OF PURCHASING POWER PARITY
Dependent Independent
Equation Variable Variable
S WPI - WPI
S RPI - RPI
S WPI - WPI
S RPI - RPI
11.5 S + WPI
- WPI
11.6 S + RPI
- RPI
-.034
(.009)
.085
(.021)
-.036
(.017)
.145
(.080)
.061
(.033)
.245
(.074)
1.206
(.017)
1.522
(.061)
1.203
(.031)
1.286
(.196)
2SEE R D - W p
.036 0.99 0.97 --
.106 0.91 0.46 --
.032 0.99
.068 0.96
-- .037
-- .066
-- 0.513
-- 0.821
-- -- 0.854
(.067)
-- -- 0.885
(.060)
Notes: The equations are estimates of y = a + ax, where y is the dependent
variable and x is the independent variable. Equations II.1 and 11.2 are
estimated by two-stage least squares, using a constant and a time trend to
form the instruments. Equations 11.3 and 11.4 are estimated by a combination
of two-stage least squares and the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure,
A
with p the estimated coefficient of serial correlation. 11.5 and 11.6 have
no independent variable; the mean a and the coefficient of serial correla-
tion are estimated by Cochrane-Orcutt.
II. 1
11.2
11.3
11.4
Notes to Table II (continued):
The variables have the following definitions: S = log of spot exchange
rate, francs/pound; WPI = log of wholesale price index, France; WPI = log
of wholesale price index, U.K.; RPI = log of retail price index, France;
RPI = log of retail price index, U.K. Source: Exchange rates are monthly
averages from Einzig (1937). Prices are from International Abstract of
Economic Statistics, 1919-1930. All regressions are run over the period
December 1921 to December 1926.
Equations 11.3 and 11.4 test purchasing power parity under the
assumption that errors are subject to first-order serial correlation.
When retail prices are used as a measure of the purchasing power par
we cannot reject the hypothesis ý = 1. When wholesale prices are used
the difference of estimated 8 from one is significant; on the other hand,
it is not very large. Serial correlation of the errors is moderate when
wholesale prices are used, higher when retail prices are used, but in
neither case can the serial correlation be regarded as very severe when
one bears in mind that we are dealing with monthly data.
Another test is reported as 11.5 and 11.6. Here we constrain B = i,
estimating the equation s + p - p = C. In this case the errors can be
interpreted as deviations from PPP, and the serial correlation measures
the persistence of these deviations. Serial correlation is more severe
here; the reason is presumably the tendency of the exchange rate to drift
upward relative to the purchasing power par over the sample period, a
drift which is captured in II.1 - 11.4 by coefficients on prices exceeding
one.
It is clear from the high values of R2 in II.1 - 11.4 that there is
a strong association between price movements and exchange rates. Another
indication of the considerable truth in PPP is given by comparing the
variance of the exchange rate itself with the variance of the exchange
rate deflated by relative prices. Over the period December 1921 to
December 1926, the variance of the log of the exchange rate deflated by
relative retail prices was only 18 percent of the variance of the log of
the unadjusted exchange rate. The log of the exchange rate adjusted by
wholesale prices had a variance only 6 percent of that of the unadjusted rate.
On this evidence, then, purchasing power parity does not seem to
fare too badly. Whey, then, has PPP been so quickly dismissed by many
studies of the French experience? The answer is presumably that one can
find examples of substantial slippage for short periods between the
exchange rate and relative prices. For example, when a government
austerity program coupled with new foreign loans caused an abrupt revival
of confidence from March to April of 1924, the exchange rate fell by
26 percent, while relative wholesale prices fell only 11 percent and
relative retail prices fell only 3 percent. Episodes like this suggest
some sort of a lag of prices behind the exchange rate.
Table III reports on some crude tests for such a lag. It shows that
simple statistical analysis confirms the casual impression of lags in price
adjustment; but further analysis indicates that, when PPP is measured by
wholesale prices, at least, the apparent lag may be an optical illusion
resulting from simultaneity (and possibly also from measurement errors).
The equation estimated in regressions III.1 - 111.4 is
Pt - Pt = a + Bst + Y(Pt- - Pt- ), where s, p, and p have the same
definitions as in Table II. A positive value of y would be evidence of
a tendency of prices ot lag the exchange rate. Equations III.1 and I1.2
show evidence for such a lag -- a short lag for wholesale prices, a much
longer lag for retail prices -- even when allowance is made for the presence
of first-order serial correlation. But when we apply an instrumental
variable approach, in equations 11.3 and 111.4, the evidence for a lag
in wholesale prices disappears. The lag in retail prices gets shorter,
although it remains significant. 1
We should note that a lag of prices behind exchange rate changes is not
necessarily evidence of price rigidity in the sense of a failure of prices
to clear markets. If a price index contains non-traded goods, it may be
less volatile than the exchange rate because the wealth effects of exchange
rate changes affect the relative price of non-traded goods. Thus in the
popular money and home goods model, devaluation is less than fully reflected
in internal depreciation.
Table III
TESTS FOR PRICE LAGS
Equation
III.1
111.2
111.3
III.4
Price
Variable
WPI
RPI
WPI
RPI
a
.033
(.007)
-.006
(.006)
.033
(.019)
-.013
(.009)
.536
(.045)
.118
(.025)
1.054
(.394)
.170
(.057)
Y
.334
(.054)
.842
(.038)
-.263
(.454)
.766
(.083)
SEE
.020
.020
.037
.021
2
.995
.993
.984
.992
P
0.345
0.153
0.532
0.264
Notes: These are estimates of the equation Pt - pt = a + 8st + Y(Pt-1 - Pt-1)
where p is the log of the French price level, p the log the U.K. price level,
and s the log of the franc/pound exchange rate. "WPI" indicates that whole-
sale prices are used, "RPI" that retail prices are used. Equations III.1
and 111.2 are estimated by Cochrane-Orcutt. Equations 111.3 and 111.4 are
estimated by a combination of two-stage least squares and Cochrane-Orcutt,
using a time trend and (pt-l - Pt- ) to form instruments.
For data sources, see Table II.
The evidence of this section is more favorable to purchasing power
parity than received opinion would have led us to expect. One can make
a fairly good case that wholesale price parity held continuously. While
the same cannot be said for retail prices, there is nothing to suggest a
serious failure of the price system to work.
C. Exchange Rates and Expectations
The central issue in analyzing the depreciation of the franc is the
question of exchange rate expectations. Our interpretation of the specu-
lation against the franc depends crucially on whether speculators were
behaving in an irrational fashion, on one side, or were making sophisticated
predictions taking the structure of the economy into account, on the other.
Let us begin by considering the possibility that expectations were
formed by extrapolating from past depreciation. This was written in Part
I as:
(8) 6t = e(st 
- st-1) + (l - 6) 6 t-1
or t - 6 t-1 = 6[(s t - st-1 -t-1 ]
where 6 is the expected one-period rate of depreciation.
To estimate (8), we need to be able to observe the expected rate of
depreciation, t. I will assume that expected depreciation can be
measured by the forward discount on the franc on the London market. This
means ignoring the possible roles of transaction costs and risk. The
direction of bias caused by these omissions is unclear.
Table IV shows the results from a number of estimates of (8) by varying
Table IV
EXTRAPOLATIVE EXPECTATIONS
Estimation
Equation period y SEE
Feb. 1922- .0332 .0038
Dec.1926 (.0069)
Feb.1922-
June 1924
July 1924-
Dec.1926
Mar. 1922-
.0334 .0044
(.0111)
.0330 .0030
(.0081)
.0279 .0037
Dec.1926 (.0064
Mar.1922-
June 1924
July 1924-
Dec.1926
.0152 .0040
(.0084)
.0346 .0030
(.0084)
.000818 2.249
.000554 2.545
.000265 1.573
.000789
.000435
.000254
.2874
.2446
.3628
-- .3126 -.213
-- .4066 -.547
.3885
Notes: These are all estimates of
dt = y[(s t - st- 1 ) - dt- 1], where
dt = 30 day forward discount on the franc, London
st = monthly average log of the exchange rate, francs/pound
Equations IV.l-IV.3 were estimated by OLS, while IV.4-IV.6 were estimated by
Cochrane-Orcutt. Exchange rates and forward rates are from Einzig (1937).
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IV. 1
IV. 2
IV. 3
IV.4
IV. 5
IV. 6 .203
_ _
techniques and over varying sample periods. Regression IV.1 is the basic
estimate, by ordinary least squares over the whole 1922-26 period. The
estimate of 8 is .0332, which may,as will be shown later, have been large
enough to have produced instability in the French economy.
The remaining estimates in Table IV are tests designed to probe
for weaknesses in the basic estimate. We might suspect that a simple
expectations formulation like (8) would appear to work well for any given
set of observations, but would be sensitive to the particular set of data.
To test this, the time period was arbitrarily cut in half and separate
regressions IV.2 and IV.3 were run. Obviously, the estimates of 8 hardly
differ at all; not surprisingly, an F-test of equality of 0 across the
regressions fails to reject at the 95 percent level.
The last three regressions in Table IV test for the possibility of
misleading results due to serial correlation. IV.4 estimates (8) by
Cochrane-Orcutt; this makes little difference to 0, while an asymptotic
t-test fails to reject p = 0 at the 95 percent level. If we nonetheless
proceed to estimate for sub-periods, some evidence of instability in the
parameters appears. Over the first half of the sample the coefficient
of extrapolation is relatively small, and there is significant negative
serial correlation -- the extrapolative hypothesis does not appear to work
too well over this period. A likelihood-ratio test of the equality of 8
and p across the sub-periods leads to rejection at the 95 percent level.1
A simple extrapolative scheme, then, appears on first inspection to
work quite well, although some problems appear on closer examination.
The test statistic is -2 log L, where L is the likelihood ratio; this
is distributed as X2(2) under the null hypothesis. The value of the
statistic is 8.42, where the 95 percent level of the chi-squared test is
5.99.
Even if these problems were not there, however, it would be a mistake
to quickly accept that expectations were actually formed extrapolatively.
As I have already emphasized, it is possible for extrapolative expectations
to look like the appropriate explanation when the actual process by which
expectations are formed is more sophisticated. And this caution is justi-
fied in this case; for while extrapolative expectations appear to fit quite
well, the evidence is also consistent with rational expectations.
Table V presents a series of tests of rational expectations. They
are based on the "efficient markets" hypothesis that the forward rate
at time t contains all the information available to investors at that
time about the spot rate at time t + 1. This has a number of implications,
which are tested in succession.
(i) The forward rate must be an unbiased predictor of the spot rate
when contracts come due, i.e., E(st - Ft_) = 0; this is tested and not
rejected in V.1.
(ii) There must be no information from past prediction mistakes about
future mistakes. If we choose periods so that forward contracts do not
overlap, this implies no serial correlation in prediction errors. Equation
V.2 tests simultaneously for bias and first-order serial correlation in
prediction errors. Since the estimation technique is nonlinear, we must
rely on asymptotic statistics. As shown in Table VI, a likelihood-ratio
test fails to reject the hypothesis of no bias and no serial correlation.
(iii) The actual spot rate must be the conditional expectation of
the spot rate, given the forward rate. This means that in a regression of
the form st a + Ft-1 we should find a = 0, B = 1. Equation V.3 tests
this, and as shown in Table VI, fails to reject.
Table V
TESTS OF RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS
(s - Ft )t t-1
SSR = .3823
= 0.0101
(.0104)
SEE = .0805 D-W = 1.8426
s - F
t t-l
= 0.0101
(.0111)
SSR = .3807
s = .2470t (.1384)
SSR = .3624
s t = .0872
(.3812)
SSR = .3612
SEE = .0803 S= .0655
+ .9471 F
(.0308)
SEE = .0790
+ .9237 Ft 1
(.0626
SEE = .0796
st = .2487 + .9612 Ft
(.1420) (.1076)
= .0856
+ .0710 Mt 2
(.1604)
= .0724
.0146 s
(.1102)
2R = .9513
R 2 = .9515
SSR = .3623 SEE = .0797 = .0748 R2 = .9513
Notes: The variables have the following definitions:
s = log of the spot exchange rate, francs per pound, for the
last week in month t
F = log of the rate of exchange on 30-day forward contracts signed
t in the last week in month t
Mt = log of note circulation in the last week of month t
All equations are estimated for the period January 1922 to December
1926. Equation V.1 is estimated by OLS; the rest by the Cochrane-
Orcutt iterative technique. Data is from Einzig (1937).
V.1
V.2
V.3
V.4
V.5
Table VI
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS
Unconstrained Constrained
Equation SSR SSR
# of
observations
chi- 95 percent
squared level
V.2 .3807 .3884 60 1.22 5.99
V.3 .3624 " " 4.31 7.81
V.4 .3612 " " 4.52 9.49
V.5 .3623 " " 4.33 9.49
These tests
+ ut where
compare the estimates in Table V with the null hypothesis
ut is "white noise." The test is constructed by noting
SSR*-SSRthat under the null hypothesis, xSSR n is distributed asymptoticallySSR
2
as X (K) where SSR* is the sum of squared residuals when the null hypothesis
is constrained to hold, SSR the sum of squared residuals in the unconstrained
regression, n the number of observations, and K the number of parameters set
free in the unconstrained regression. On this, see Theil (1971).
Notes:
s t = Ft-
(iv) One should not be able to improve on the forward rate as a
predictor by using information available to the market when forward con-
tracts were signed. This is tested in V.4 and V.5, respectively, in the
regression. Neither contributes significant additional explanatory power.
While it is never possible to prove that expectations are rational,
it can be said that the forward market in francs for 1922-26 passes
the obvious tests of rationality. But we have also seen that, although
it is not entirely satisfactory, an extrapolative scheme appears to ac-
count reasonably well for expectations. Since the stability of the economy
depends on which of these is correct, is there any way to settle the
question?
There are two points that should be made. The first is that the
extrapolative expectations mechanism looks less adequate when we look
at very short-run behavior. Dulles (1929) showed that movements in daily
rates were clearly associated with unanticipated political events, sug-
gesting that investors were more sophisticated in their behavior than
an extrapolative scheme would allow.1
The second point to make is based on the theoretical analysis of
Part I. We saw there that a "rational" depreciation can look like a
case of extrapolative expectations, but that the reverse is not true. If
the actual mechanism of of expectations formation were extrapolative we
would expect to find evidence of persistent errors of prediction. What
we have just shown is that there is no evidence for such persistent errors.
An empirical study of foreign exchange markets by Black (1973) demon-
strates the importance of political events by an ingenious dummy-variable
technique.
In the end, however, the best argument for believing in sophisticated
behavior by investors is that it enables us to tell a coherent story
about the monetary history of France in the 1920's; and to explain why
expectations appeared destabilizing in France when they have appeared
stabilizing in other cases. I will develop the story below; but first
it will be necessary to take a closer look at the monetary mechanism.
D. The Monetary Mechanism
The role of monetary expansion in exchange depreciation remains highly
disputed. It is not denied that large depreciations are invariably accom-
panied by increases in the money supply, but some authors, notably Nurkse
(1944) and Aliber (1962) have argued that the money supply is in fact
endogneous, playing a passive rather than active role in the prices of
depreciation. This fits in well with the model of extrapolative expecta-
tions developed in Part I, where an accommodating monetary policy can be
a factor producing instability. In fact, there is considerable justifi-
cation for a view that regards the money supply as an endogenous variable
in the short run in post-World War I France.
Let us begin, however, by looking at the demand for money. We would
expect the demand for money to depend on "the" interest rate. Unfortunately,
no usable short-term interest rate data were available for France. I
have dealt with this problem by exploiting the interest parity theorem
to derive an implicit interest rate for France. In the absence of trans-
action costs and default risk, interest parity says that r = r + 6,
where r is the domestic interest rate, r the foreign interest rate, and
6 the forward discount against domestic currency. Thus we can construct
an implicit interest rate for France by adding U.K. bank rate, converted
to a monthly rate, to the 30-day forward discount on the franc. This
variable appears as R in Table VII.
Table VII presents several estimates of the demand for money in
France, 1922-26. The dependent variable in the equations is the log of
"velocity," as measured by the ratio of the price level to the money supply.
In VII.1 and VII.3 the price level is measured by retail prices; in VII.2
and VII.4 by wholesale prices. The independent variable in each case is
the implicit interest rate defined above. I experimented with real output
as an additional explanatory variable, but it did not have significant
explanatory power.
Since, as we will see in a moment, the money supply and the interest
rate must be regarded as jointly determined, it was necessary to use an
instrumental variable technique in estimating these equations. I made
use of a technique originally proposed by Wald and described in Theil
(1971): a dummy variable was constructed, which equalled one in periods
when the forward discount exceeded its median value, and zero elsewhere.
Combining this with French bank rate to form instruments, we get the
reported results. These indicate a well-behaved demand for money, although
one with a good deal of "noise." The standard errors of the equations can
be interpreted as typical percentage errors, and indicate that velocity was
not very stable. But the interest rate had the expected sign, and a plausible
magnitude: at a six percent annual rate of interest, a 8 of 20 would
correspond to an interest elasticity of 0.1. Serial correlation, which can
often be regarded as a test for misspecification, is substantial, but not
exceptional given that we are dealing with monthly data.
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Table VII
MONEY DEMAND EQUATIONS
-Measure 2 ^
Equation of Prices a 
_ SEE R D - W P
VII.1 RPI -.066 16.647 .081 .1274 0.825
(.020) (2.491)
VII.2 WPI .078 24.438 .125 .2476 0.645
(.031) (3.855)
VII.3 RPI -.050 14.853 .061 .5131 -- 0.624
(.041) (4.930)
VII.4 WPI .150 16.147 .065 .7917 -- 0.788
(.073) (8.279)
Notes: These equations are estimated on monthly data from December 1921 to
December 1926. All estimates are of the equation p - m = o + aR, where p is
the log of the price level, m the log of note circulation, and R the implicit
interest rate described in the test. The price level is measured by retail
prices in equations labeled "RPI," by wholesale in equations labeled "WPI."
All equations were estimated by two-stage least squares; to form instru-
ments, French bank rate and the Wald variable described in the text were
used. In VII.3 and VII.4, 2SLS was combined with Cochrane-Orcutt; the
A
estimated serial correlation is reported as p.
Data on prices and note circulation are from International Abstract of
Economic Statistics, 1919-1930; data on interest rates and forward rates from
Einzig (1937).
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These results support the contention that there was a well-behaved
demand for money in interwar France. But what about lags in the adjust-
ment of prices to nominal demand? Table VIII presents some tests for
such lags. In an expression relating the price level to the supply of
money, the interest rate, and the price level lagged, a positive coef-
ficient on the last variable would be evidence for slow price adjustment.
The results are somewhat similar in their implications to the tests for
lags in section B above. Least squares estimates (Equations VIII.1 and
VIII.2), while not turning up any evidence of a lag of wholesale prices
behind money, do support the notion of a lag in retail prices. But this
result, which confirms casual observation, may be the result of a statisti-
cal illusion; for when an instrumental variable approach is applied, there
is no longer a clear case for the existence of a lag. It is at least an
open possibility, then, that over the 1922-26 period the effect of monetary
disturbances on prices was more or less immediate.
More problematical is the question of money supply. If by "money"
we mean note circulation, this is a variable commonly regarded as a policy
instrument. There is no reason to expect there to be a well-defined supply
function of notes at all. Nonetheless, a comparison of note circulation with
the implicit interest rate, R, shown in Figure II, conveys an irrestible
impression of endogeneity. In the two sudden speculative attacks of
1923-24 and 1926, the increase in the implicit interest rate was accom-
panied by an increase in note circulation. This may in part have reflected
changes in banks' borrowing via the discount window. But it is also
reflecting the financial position of the government.
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Table VIII
TESTS FOR LAGS OF PRICES BEHIND MONEY
Dependent 2 ^
Equation Variable a b c d SEE R p
VIII.1 WPI 0.223 1.046 2.976 0.095 .037 .981 0.890
(.065) (.302) (1.221) (.146)
VIII.2 RPI -0.002 0.358 1.166 0.752 .020 .992 0.464
(.074) (.104) (.705) (.070)
VIII.3 WDI 0.305 1.891 9.544 -0.497 .048 .968 0.904
(.116) (.700) (9.216) (.390)
VIII.4 RPI -0.004 1.240 -3.165 0.270 .030 .982 0.808
(.038) (.558) (5.542) (.308)
Notes: These are estimates of the equation p = a + b * m + c - R + d - pl
where p = log of price index
m = log of note circulation
R = implicit interest rate
The price index used is that of retail prices where the table indicates
RPI, wholesale elsewhere. For sources of data, see Table VII. All estimates
were monthly February 1922 to December 1926.
Equations VIII.1 and VIII.2 were estimated by Chchrane-Orcutt; VIII.3
and VIII.4 by a combination of instrumental variables and Cochrane-Orcutt,
with the instrumental variables: time trend, bank rate, forward discount
dummy, and lagged prices.
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For government finance, as a number of authors1 have emphasized,
was a major factor making France's monetary system "elastic." France
emerged from World War I with a large public debt, much of it (about a
third) in short-term securities. The existence of this debt, combined
with the unwillingness of the government to vary the interest paid on
securities, led to a situation in which speculative attacks on the franc
induced monetary expansion. Whenever investors became less willing to
hold franc-denominated securities -- i.e., the implicit interest rate
rose -- the government was unable to roll over debt as it matured without
offering higher interest rates. Instead of doing this, the government
habitually acquired the necessary cash by borrowing from the central bank.
In effect, increases in interest rates caused the government to monetize
a part of its debt.
This process naturally had a negative effect on the real or apparent
stability of the economy. If expectations were formed extrapolatively,
the accommodating monetary policy of the government could have destabilized
an otherwise stable economy. This possibility arose in the theoretical
analysis of Part I of the paper, and played a key role in the analyses
of Aliber and Tsiang. In the Appendix to this part of the paper, the
question is examined empirically.
If expectations are assumed, instead, to have been rational, it is
nonetheless plausible that an interest-elastic money supply in the short
The role of the government budget in the money supply process during
this period has been emphasized by Dulles (1929). Tsiang (1959) provided
an analysis of the process of money supply, which was further extended
by Aliber (1962).
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run would make the economy seem less stable, because it would make the
current exchange rate more sensitive to changes in expectations about
future monetary policy. Following Mussa (1976), we can derive from
the simple monetary model of Part I under rational expectations an
expression for the current exchange rate of the form
t  1+ ( +i) ) 0 1 + + P ) tt+j
where K is a constant, X and p are interest semi-elasticities of supply
and demand for money, respectively, and tmt+j is the expectation at
time t of the shift parameter in money supply at time t+j. The further
in the future is a change in m, the less it matters; but the rate at which
the importance of future events falls off is less, the more accommodating
is monetary policy.
Government finance, then, is the key to understanding changes in the
money supply in the short run, The budget also played a crucial role in
determining the long-run rate of monetary expansion. Like most European
countries, France was in financial difficulty in the years following the
First World War. Since France won the war, its problems were not as
severe as those of some countries; little difficulty was experienced in
raising enough revenue to meet ordinary expenses. But France had paid
for the war almost entirely by borrowing, and the debt service accounted
for over 40 percent of expenditures in the middle 1920's.1
This figure is taken from Dulles (1929). Budget figures for France
in this period are not trustworthy, since government finance consisted
of dozens of independent budgets; but the order of magnitude is surely
right.
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In this situation, money creation offered an attractive alternative
to government belt-tightening. By borrowing from the Bank of France, the
government not only directly augmented its current revenue, it indirectly
reduced future expenditures in real terms. This latter effect was first
noted by Keynes (1924), who pointed out that increases in the money sup-
ply, by inducing inflation, reduced the real value of long-term debt.
Keynes used this as an argument against returning the franc to its pre-
war parity; but the argument holds equally as a reason why further infla-
tion would have seemed attractive to the government.
Some authors have questioned the validity of Keynes' argument.
Aliber (1962), in particular, argued that the tax system was incompletely
indexed, so that real revenues fell as a result of inflation. This led
him to maintain that expectations of depreciation were self-fulfilling,
because they led to greater budget deficits and therefore monetary expan-
sion. The evidence is, however, against this argument. Table IX gives
some comparisons of revenue and expenditure with retail prices. As Aliber
argued, revenues barely kept up with retail prices, in spite of new taxes,
which may be an indication of less than complete indexation of the tax
system. But this was more than compensated for by the failure of ex-
penditure to rise in proportion to prices. This is not surprising when
one bears in mind that most of the expenditures of the French government
went for debt service, pensions, and wages, all of which failed to keep
pace with inflation. There can therefore be little doubt that Keynes was
right in arguing that inflation had a beneficial effect on the budget.
Thus there was a real incentive for the French government to pursue
a policy of inflation. How did the government respond? From 1922 to 1928
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Table IX
PRICES AND THE BUDGET
(Billion Francs)
Retail 1
prices,
June
Real
Real Expend- expend-
Revenue revenue iture iture
Debt
service
Real
debt
service
1922 307 24.2 24.2 48.9 48.9 14.1 14.1
1923 331 27.7 25.7 45.8 42.5 14.7 13.6
1924 370 31.1 25.8 40.2 33.4 15.6 12.9
1925 422 29.5 21.5 34.2 24.9 15.5 11.3
1926 544 45.1 25.5 44.9 25.3 15.9 9.0
Notes: Real revenue and real expenditure are revenue and expenditure
in 1922 francs, using retail prices as deflator. All data is from
Dulles (1930).
108
note circulation increased by two-thirds. The increase was not, however,
achieved by a deliberate polciy of money finance. It was primarily
achieved in two ways. We have already seen one of them: the monetization
of short-term debt in response to speculation against the franc. The
other was money creation through the balance of payments. In 1926, when
the franc began to recover from a speculative attack, the Bank of France
intervened to hold the franc at four cents. At that rate there was an
immediate capital inflow; further, the exchange rate was high enough to
produce large current account surpluses for the remainder of the 1920's,
which were not sterilized.
It would almost surely be wrong, however, to regard the inflation in
France as accidental and independent of government policy. A more accurate
description of what happened would be that the government avoided taking
action until it was forced to; but that the actions it then took were
in the direction of inflation.
E. An Interpretation of Events
What happened in France 1922-1926? Was it an unstable ~speculative
run, or simply a matter of sophisticated forward-looking behavior by
investors? We now have enough evidence to attempt to provide an answer.
In the discussion above I have analyzed a number of aspects of the
French experience. Three results should be emphasized in particular:
(i) The evidence from the forward markets is consistent with the
notion that expectations about future exchange rates were formed in a
sophisticated, "rational" manner.
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(ii) Because of the endogeneity of the money supply, the exchange
rate was highly sensitive to changes in expectations.
(iii) The government was subject to budgetary difficulties which
could be, and in the end largely were, solved by inflation.
These observations, together with the theoretical analysis, suggest
a simple story about what happened in France. If we grant that there
were forces pushing the government toward inflationary policies; and if we
further suppose that speculators were aware of these forces; then the
natural explanation of depreciation in France is that the market was
reacting to anticipated monetary expansion. Political news would produce
sudden changes in exchange rates whenever it led investors to change their
opinions about the likely monetization of the debt.1
This explanation is attractive because it is economical. Events in
France can be seen as being all of one piece, deriving ultimately from
the French decision to finance the First World War entirely by borrowing.
And it provides a reason why the behavior of speculators in francs appears
destabilizing when at the same time speculation in, say, Dutch guilders
seemed stabilizing.
But if the explanation is correct, we must conclude that speculation
did not play an autonomous role in making the French economy unstable.
An instructive example is provided by the crisis of summer 1926. That
crisis was set off by the appointment of a Finance Minister who was an
avowed believer in the plafond unique: a doctrine which held, in modern
terminology, that short-term debt and cash were equally liquid assets and
that therefore monetizing part of the government's short-term obligations
would not have an inflationary impact. The market disagreed, and the franc
fell sharply. This account is drawn from Dulles (1929).
2For descriptions of monetary developments in other European countries during
the same period, see Tsiang (1959) and Aliber (1962).
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In fact, the economy was not unstable at all. Depreciation was caused
by the government's budget problems, and in the end provided its own cure.
France in the 1920's has always been regarded as a key example of
the undesirability of flexible exchange rates. I have shown that the
alleged instability caused by speculation is highly questionable, and that
on balance the evidence suggests a stable economy, The major lesson to be
learned may be that casual observation is not always sufficient as a
basis for judging how well a market is working.
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APPENDIX TO PART II
THE STABILITY OF THE FRENCH ECONOMY
If expectations are formed in an ad hoc, extrapolative manner, there
is a possibility of large-scale speculative runs which destabilize the
economy. While the conclusion of this paper has been that expectations
were in fact formed in a more sophisticated way, it is interesting to
impose the hypothesis of extrapolative expectations and examine the
stability of the system.
Let us suppose, then, that the French economy can be described for
our purposes by three equations: a demand for money schedule, a supply
for money schedule, and an expectations formation equation, with the
following functional forms:
(Bl) p - m = - 0 + al(r + 6)
(B2) m = B0 + 1l (r + 6) + B0d + $3t
(B3) 6 - 8_1 = y(s - S_1 ) - Y6_1
where
p = log of the wholesale price index
m = log of note circulation
r = foreign interest rate
d = central bank discount rate
t = time trend
6 = forward discount on the currency
s = log of the exchange rate
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The system may be closed by the assumption of purchasing power
parity, s = p.
If we disregard the case of unstable oscillations, stability of this
system depends on whether Y(aI + is less than or greater than one (as
shown in Part I).
Table X reports an estimate of the system (Bl) - (B3) on French data
1922-1926. It was assumed that (Bl) and (B2) were characterized by first-
order serial correlation of the error terms, so the system was estimated
by nonlinear three stage least squares. The estimates of (Bl) and (B3)
differ somewhat from the estimates reported in Tables II and VII, above,
because of the use of a different instrument list and because the estimates
here take account of cross-equation covariance.
Of the estimates, one should note in particular the money supply
equation. Perhaps surprisingly, the coefficients on the interest rate and
the rediscount rate come out with the right sighs. The implausibly large
coefficient on the rediscount rate suggests, however, that the rate is
serving as a proxy for monetary policy in general. Thus the equation is
presumably more or less misspecified.1 But it nonetheless confirms the
impression of endogeneity of the money supply.
Using the estimates in Table X, we can test for stability by computing
the value of y(al + 1). We can then compare this statistic with the value
of ya1, which is Cagan's (1956) test statistic -- the condition for stability
1
The fact that it was not possible to come up with a plausible money supply
equation is the reason the estimates of (Bl) and (B3) used in the text are
based on limited-information methods rather than full-information methods of
the kind used here. For full-information methods allow a misspecification of
one equation to "contaminate" estimates of others.
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Table X
SYSTEMS ESTIMATES
(BI): p - m = 0.198 + 13.790 (r + 6)
(.098) (10.267)
^ 2
p = 0.899, SEE = .039, R = .921
(B2): m = 0.189 + 11.155 (r + 6)
(0.181) (5.274)
- 77.362 d + 0.009 t
(45.708) (0.002)
^ R2
p = 0.887, SEE = .015, R = .990
(B3): (6 - 6•) = 0.035 [(s - s) - 6i_]
(.006)
SEE = .0037, R2 = 0.2895, D-W = 2.209
Notes: These equations were estimated simultaneously by three-stage least
squares. The variables have the definitions given in the text. Data was
monthly from January 1922 to December 1926. The instrumental variables
were: the right hand side variable in (B3), the rediscount rate, time
trend, the dummy variable for forward discount described in the test,
lagged p - m, and lagged m.
Price and money supply data are from International Abstract of Economic
Statistics, 1919-1930; exchange market data from Einzig (1937).
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if the money supply is exogenous. We find the following: the point
estimate of y 1l is 0.485, with an asymptotic standard error of 0.371;
the point estimate of y(a~ + Q1) is 0.878, with an asymptotic standard
error of 0.428. In both cases the point estimate is within the stable
range, while in neither case can we reject at the 95 percent level the
hypothesis of instability. But the endogeneity of the money supply does
push the structure of the economy closer to the border of instability.
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